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ABSTRACT 
Three facts bear notice in connection with our current financial 
troubles. The first is that the First World War, before the Second began, 
was known as ―the Great War.‖ The second is that the global Depression 
that struck between those two wars—which, thankfully, it appears we can 
still label ―Great‖ for the time being—commenced with the burst of a 
multiyear real estate price bubble prior to the 1929 stock market crash. 
The third is that the United States accordingly addressed that depression 
through mutually reinforcing new regimes not only of financial regulation, 
but also of home mortgage finance—the very reforms that brought us 
―securitization‖ and the familiar thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgage. Our 
present difficulties, moreover, stem directly from recent departures from 
that originally bipartisan package of mutually reinforcing mortgage and 
finance-regulatory innovations.  
Approaches to today‘s financial crisis have been strangely unmindful 
of the history, innovations, and bipartisanship just mentioned. They have 
also been inattentive to the well-established historical linkage between 
protracted economic contractions on the one hand, and paired stock and 
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real estate crashes on the other. That is surprising not only because these 
matters are so salient right now. It is surprising also because the reason 
for the historical link between real estate slumps and broader economic 
contractions is not hard to find: For the overwhelming majority of 
Americans, homes are by far the most valuable assets they own. When 
their values plummet, wealth, credit, consumer confidence, and spending 
soon follow. The lesson for today is quite clear: No approach to our 
present financial crisis that does not address the mortgage crisis at its 
core can succeed in the long run, or even the short run.  
This Article prescribes means of addressing our current financial crisis 
by addressing the mortgage crisis at its core. It targets both the short and 
the long term. In a manner that is sensitive both to the historical roots and 
to the still operative etiology of the current crisis, it develops a fully 
integrated, systematic protocol for treating our present financial ills.  
The Article first structurally characterizes the nature of credit-fueled 
asset price bubbles and the financial pathologies to which they give rise. It 
emphasizes that this structure is compatible both with long-term 
informational efficiency on the part of asset markets, and with individual 
rationality on the part of market participants. The challenge presented by 
asset bubbles, the Article argues, is not individual irrationality or 
informational inefficiency, but a classic coordination problem. Mistaken 
assumptions to the contrary account in large measure for our failure to 
have prevented, and for our ineffectiveness thus far in addressing, the 
present crisis. Coordination problems require coordinative responses. 
Absent such responses to credit cycles and financial systems conceived as 
wholes, piecemeal regulatory measures cannot properly discharge their 
functions.  
The Article next shows our current difficulties indeed to have stemmed 
from a classic credit-fueled asset price bubble first in the stock, then in the 
housing markets over the decade ending in 2006. This bubble was 
strikingly reminiscent both of that which preceded the 1928–29 American 
real estate and stock market crashes and ensuing deflation, and of more 
recent such stories in Asia. The Article then lays out responsive near-term 
solutions to the present crisis as thus characterized, followed by longer-
term measures that will maintain health both in real estate finance and in 
the financial system more generally. The key to a short-term solution lies 
in employing those institutions we first put into place to deal with our last 
great real estate bubble and burst, that of 1928. Those institutions are the 
Federal Housing Administration and its recently renationalized GSE 
siblings, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/1
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The key to longer-term maintenance, the Article then argues, is two-
fold. Above all, we must restore the Federal Reserve‘s original role as 
bubble-preventive credit-regulator—what the Article calls ―regulation as 
modulation.‖ Complementary to this task will be the development of more 
effective bubble-detection methodologies, which can be developed but, as 
public goods, are currently underprovided. Likewise complementary to 
credit modulation will be the extension of familiar disclosure and firewall 
protections from those older fields of finance where they have been 
operative since the 1930s, to new fields of finance that have developed 
more recently in the shadows. Getting finance and the credit-debt cycle 
right, the Article concludes, will get the business cycle and stable growth 
right as well. Stop bubbles, and we will stop bursts and deflations alike. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: REAL ESTATE, RECESSION, AND KEEPING THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION ―GREAT‖ 
Unnerving though it is to recall them right now, three facts bear noting 
in connection with our present financial troubles. The first is that the First 
World War, before the Second commenced, was popularly known as ―the 
Great War.‖ The second is that the 1930s-era global Depression we can 
still thankfully call ―Great‖ began with the burst of a multiyear asset price 
bubble in the American real estate, then stock markets.
1
 The third is that 
we addressed this depression most effectively by developing what, at the 
time, were remarkably innovative, mutually reinforcing new systems of 
mortgage finance and financial regulation.
2
 Both the Hoover and 
Roosevelt Administrations designed these systems to operate in tandem.
3
 
Together they brought us not only those familiar forms of bank and 
securities regulation still largely operative today and well recognized to be 
products of their era, but also securitization and the familiar thirty-year, 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE 
NINETEEN-TWENTIES 234–50 (1931); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929, at 3–7 
(1954); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY 
OF FINANCIAL CRISES 117–21 (5th ed. 2005). Our present woes issue from a story in which this 
order—real estate, then stock—is simply reversed, we shall see.  
 2. See infra Part III. 
 3. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/1
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fixed-rate mortgage—curiously less widely recognized today to stem from 
that era.
4
  
Some or all of these observations might come as news to nonexperts. In 
the received telling, the tale of the 1930s depression places the stock 
market crash of October 1929 center stage, with a nod perhaps given the 
bank runs of 1932 and Roosevelt‘s ―bank holiday‖ of March 1933.5 Real 
estate and mortgage finance seldom find their way into the story at all. At 
best they receive rare passing mention—along with flappers, jazz, and 
raccoon coats—as token emblems of those excesses routinely catalogued 
under the heady rubric of ―The Roaring 20s.‖6  
But emphasis on the role of real estate finance in the 1930s depression 
will not surprise many financial historians or central bankers. It is a virtual 
commonplace among these that the worst, most protracted economic 
slumps—including most recently those in Japan and the rest of East 
Asia—typically emerge from conjoined stock and real estate crashes.7 
Why might that be? The principal reason is right under our noses: Homes 
are, in most developed economies, by far the most valuable assets most 
people own and borrow against;
8
 when they plummet in value or are lost in 
foreclosure, personal wealth, credit, purchasing power, and consumer 
confidence rapidly follow.
9
 Stock and bond portfolios, as most citizens‘ 
 
 
 4. The standard introductory textbooks on financial institutions and markets speak of 
securitization almost as something that emerged spontaneously in the 1990s, rather than by statutory 
design in the 1930s. See, e.g., FRANK FABOZZI ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
AND MARKETS (3d ed. 2002); MEIR G. KOHN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS (2d ed. 2003). 
By way of what I hope is a refreshing contrast, see ROBERT HOCKETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
FINANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (forthcoming 2010). See also 
Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and Finance in 
the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American ―Ownership Society,‖ 79 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 45 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means].  
 5. The ―bank run‖ scene of Frank Capra‘s It‘s a Wonderful Life is particularly popular for these 
purposes. I myself use it in teaching Financial Regulation. Much more such footage is on view at the 
Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York. It is telling—and gratifying to a finance professor—to 
note that among the many accomplishments of the first Roosevelt Administration touted on campaign 
flyers during the 1936 reelection campaign now on display at that library, upwards of half are finance-
regulatory in nature.  
 6. See, e.g., Galbraith, supra note 1, at 3–8 (a droll and revealing, if not altogether systematic, 
case in point).  
 7. Asia is not alone here. It is noteworthy that all of the most conspicuous financial crises of 
recent decades critically involved stocks and real estate together. These include the cases of Japan in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s; Sweden and Mexico in the middle 1990s; Thailand, Singapore, and 
South Korea in the late 1990s; Argentina at the turn of the millennium; and now the U.S. See, e.g., 
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 142–64; see also Jean-Claude Trichet, President, Eur. 
Cent. Bank, Mas Lecture: Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy, available at http://www.ecb.int/ 
press/key/date/2005/html/sp050608.en.html (last visited May 18, 2010) [hereinafter ECB Speech].  
 8. See, e.g., KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 117–21; ECB Speech, supra note 7. 
 9. See, e.g., KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1; see also ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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distantly second most valuable asset holdings, simply amplify the waves 
generated by real estate fluctuation.
10
 Scarce wonder, then, that the Hoover 
and Roosevelt Administrations addressed our last, ―Great‖ depression 
through a package of mutually complementary mortgage-finance and 
finance-regulatory reforms.
11
  
Against this well-established historical backdrop, it was perplexing, in 
late 2008 and much of 2009, to find the principal national and global 
responses to our recent financial woes boasting every stratagem but that of 
forthrightly arresting our real estate crash and attendant foreclosure 
crisis.
12
 Real estate seemed to be taken by most for a mere side show or 
sadly peripheral ―human interest story‖—something like the 1930s-era 
bread lines or Steinbeck novels—rather than central to our broader 
national and transnational financial turmoil. In consequence, our 
governments seemed to be fiddling, with no discernible melody, while a 
great city burned: the city of Hoover- and Roosevelt-designed mortgage 
finance and financial regulation, which made the United States, in large 
part, a nation of homeowners and stockholders.
13
 
What, then, have we been doing? Congress and the White House first 
agreed on a stopgap financial ―bailout‖ plan early in October 2008.14 The 
so-called ―Troubled Asset Relief Plan‖ (TARP; the Plan) was remarkable 
in several respects. As a fiscal matter, the Plan‘s sheer size—over $700 
billion, with no assurance that this would be all—was unprecedented in 
both real and nominal terms.
15
 As a legal matter, the sheer breadth of 
barely reviewable discretion that the TARP afforded Treasury pressed 
hard against constitutional limits on executive branch authority.
16
 Lawyers 
 
 
EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE]; ROBERT J. SHILLER, 
THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY‘S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT (2008) [hereinafter SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION].   
 10. For more on American patterns of securities ownership, see Robert Hockett, What Kinds of 
Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other SOPs, and ―Ownership Societies,‖ 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 865 (2007).  
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV.A. 
 13. One might even call this ―city‖ an ―ownership society.‖ See, e.g., infra Part IV.A; see also 
Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 4; Robert Hockett, Whose 
Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2005).  
 14. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). 
 15. Adjusted to 2008 dollars, the S&L cleanup cost $150 billion. See, e.g., CHARLES R. MORRIS, 
THE TWO TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT 
CRASH 83 (2008).  
 16. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Some Ask If Bailout Is Constitutional, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at 
A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/16challenge.html; see also Fabius 
Maximus, Legal experts discuss if the Paulson Plan is legal, Sept. 21, 2008, http://fabiusmaximus. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/1
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seemed widely agreed that the original, three-page version of the TARP 
delegated authority far in excess of constitutional limits.
17
 The amended, 
400-page version—at least ―as applied‖ to the crisis—did not fare much 
better. For at least as striking as the TARP‘s fiscal scale and delegated 
executive scope was the remarkably restless, if not capricious, character of 
actions taken under the Plan after enactment.  
Secretary Paulson originally pitched the TARP in September 2008 as a 
proposed ―buy-up‖ of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), said to be 
clogging the credit markets.
18
 That, we shall see, was a worthwhile aim—
but it was quickly abandoned. Paulson next began speaking, in mid-
October of 2008, of ―buying-in‖ to troubled financial institutions by 
purchasing nonvoting shares in them.
19
 Paulson held that the equity 
injection strategy would render lendable funds more quickly available to 
lenders, restoring liquidity to credit markets more expeditiously than the 
original buy-up plan.
20
 By early November, Treasury reported that the 
 
 
wordpress.com/2008/09/21/paulson-plan/ (cataloguing some of the many weblog entries by law 
professors at the time of the bailout bill discussions). 
 17. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Bailout Above the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at C1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/23sorkin.html?scp=1&sq=troubled%20 
asset%20relief%20&%20september%202008&st=cse; Posting of David Zaring to The Conglomerate, 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/ 2008/09/the-bailout-sta.html (Sept. 20, 2008); Posting of Eric Posner 
to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/ archives/archive_2008_09_14-2008_09_20.shtml#122 
1958868 (Sept. 20, 2008, 22:01 EST); Posting of Eric Posner to The Volokh Conspiracy, 
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2008_09_14-2008_09_20.shtml#1221830018 (Sept. 19, 2008, 
10:13 EST); Posting of Lawrence R. Velvel to Commondreams.org, http://www.commondreams.org/ 
view/2008/09/19-0 (Sept. 19, 2008). 
 18. Turmoil in US Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored Entities, 
Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 2 (2008), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_ 
files/PAULSONTestimony92308.pdf (statement of Henry J. Paulson, Jr., Secretary of the United 
States Treasury).  
 19. Edmund L. Andrews & Mark Landler, White House Overhauling Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 11, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/business/12imf.html?scp=3& 
sq=troubled%20asset%20relief%20&%20october%202008&st=cse.  
 20. Id. Not so, per the institutionally sensitive ―financial accelerator‖ and ―credit rationing‖ 
accounts of financial institutions developed by monetary economists in recent decades. See, e.g., 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & BRUCE C.N. GREENWALD, TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM IN MONETARY 
ECONOMICS (2003); Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Banking and Macroeconomic Equilibrium, in 
NEW APPROACHES TO MONETARY ECONOMICS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL 
SYMPOSIUM IN ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS 89 (William A. Barnett & Kenneth J. 
Singleton eds., 1987); Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business 
Fluctuations, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 14 (1989); Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Financial Fragility and 
Economic Performance, 105 Q.J. ECON. 87 (1990); Ben Bernanke, Mark Gertler & Simon Gilchrist, 
The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality, 78 REV. ECON. STAT. 1 (1996); Joseph E. Stiglitz 
& Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 
(1981).   
Washington University Open Scholarship
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buy-in plan would entirely supplant the earlier buy-up plan.
21
  
In mid-November, however, Treasury announced it would enter the 
short-term debt markets as well, once again ―buying-up‖ rather than just 
―buying-in.‖22 Then, near the end of November, the plan changed again. 
Now Treasury would resume purchasing ―toxic‖ assets, but more kinds 
than MBSs.
23
 Finally, in December 2008, talk turned toward employing 
TARP moneys to tide over automakers as well, a course of action that, by 
early 2009, had begun to be taken.
24
 And so things have more or less 
continued to the present, even since a new Treasury‘s taking of the reins to 
spend from the final installment of TARP funds, and subsequently to 
recoup many of those funds from their original recipients.  
Throughout all of these pivots and changes of direction, a few voices 
softer than Treasury‘s were offering proposals that targeted the proximate 
cause of our present financial distress.
25
 That, as suggested a moment ago, 
is our recently corrupted system of home mortgage finance. In particular, 
it is the ongoing foreclosure crisis afflicting our post-bubble real estate 
markets.
26
 With time and continued tumult, these proposals—which are 
much better focused as a financial matter, and less constitutionally 
troubling as a legal matter than TARP was thought by many to be—have 
come gradually to be more widely heard.
27
 Now, even President Obama, 
 
 
 21. More on Henry Paulson‘s Bailout Update, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/ 
henry-paulsons-bailout-update/?scp=44&sq=troubled%20asset%20relief%20&%20novmber%202008 
&st=cse (Nov. 12, 2008, 11:15 EST).  
 22. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Shifts Focus in Credit Bailout to the Consumer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
13, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/business/economy/13bailout.html? 
scp=4&sq=troubled%20asset%20relief%20&%20novmber%202008&st=cse.  
 23. Alan S. Blinder, Missing the Target with $700 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at BU4, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/economy/21view.html?scp=46&sq=troub 
led%20asset%20relief%20&%20novmber%202008&st=cse; Jeff Zeleny, Obama and Bush Working to 
Calm Volatile Market, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008, at A1, available at http://www. nytimes.com/2008/ 
11/25/us/politics/25obama.html?scp=45&sq=troubled%20asset%20relief%20&%20novmber%202008
&st=cse. 
 24. See Posting of Steven M. Davidofff to Dealbook, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008 
/12/09/the-new-auto-bailout-bill/?scp=7&sq=automobile%20manufacturers%20bailout&st=cse (Dec. 
9, 2008, 9:56 EST).  
 25. See infra note 26. 
 26. See, e.g., R. Glenn Hubbard & Chris Mayer, First, Let‘s Stabilize Home Prices, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 2, 2008, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122291076983796813.html; 
Democracy Now!: ―Bridge Loan to Nowhere‖ (television broadcast Sept. 30, 2008), available at 
http://www. democracynow.org/2008/9/30/bridge_loan_to_nowhere_house_rejects; Democracy Now!: 
Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz: Bail Out Wall Street Now, Change Terms Later (television broadcast 
Oct. 2, 2008), available at http://www.democracynow.org/2008/10/2/nobel_laureate_joseph_stiglitz_ 
bailout_wall; Posting of Robert Hockett to Dorf on Law, http://michaeldorf.org/2008/09/treasurys-
planned-bailout-is-fhas.html (Sept. 25, 2008, 14:33 EST).  
 27. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, CHALLENGE, Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 
36; see also Blinder, supra note 23, at 1; SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION, supra note 9; John D. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/1
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Federal Reserve (Fed) Chair Bernanke, and Treasury Secretary Geithner 
pay at least lip service to the need of a bottom to falling mortgage 
markets—and to spend some of the original and since-recovered TARP 
moneys to do so.
28
  
It is very good news that now, more are looking to stemming 
foreclosures as means of addressing our wider financial crisis.
29
 However 
badly needed the transfusion supplied by the first stages of TARP might 
have been to keep the ―patients‖ (our banks and other financial 
institutions) alive on the table, the fact is that these patients—and the 
Treasury—can be expected to continue to ―bleed‖ until we at last stanch 
the flow, and the threat, of foreclosures still facing us. The only real 
question is how best to do that. The question of how to end our financial 
crisis, in short, boils down in significant part to the question of how to end 
our mortgage crisis—and to prevent a recurrence.  
This Article aims to address those two questions head on, just as the 
late Hoover and Roosevelt Administrations did—as a package. It supplies 
an integrated set of short-term and longer-term answers, rooted in careful 
structural and historical diagnosis of our present ills.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II first elaborates the 
aforementioned diagnosis. In particular, it shows that we are indeed 
coming off of a causally interconnected pair of tech stock and real estate 
bubbles. The real estate bubble in particular was one which, 
notwithstanding the assurances of former Fed Chairman Greenspan to the 
contrary, could be seen in the making even as it was inflating—hence, 
could have been stopped.
30
 Like other bubbles, moreover, this one‘s 
growth was compatible with market efficiency and individual rationality. 
Indeed, in the presence of historically low and, at times, even negative real 
 
 
Geanakoplos & Susan P. Koniak, Op-Ed., Mortgage Justice Is Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at 
A39, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/30/opinion/30geanakoplos.html; John D. 
Geanakoplos & Susan P. Koniak, Why the Blind Trustee Plan is Cheaper and Better than Alternatives 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/docu 
ments/pdf/cbl/Koniak_Blind_Trustee.pdf (last visited May 18, 2010); George M. Cohen, Susan P. 
Koniak & John D. Geankoplos, Mortgage and Securities Stabilization, Recovery and Modification 
Program Act of 2009, http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/Koniak_Mortgage_Securities.pdf 
(last visited May 18, 2010). For a welcome indication that the Obama administration might now be 
poised to take the mortgage problem at the root of our broader financial difficulties more seriously, 
see, e.g., Renae Merle, Geithner Tells Panel That More Has to Be Done to Help Homeowners Avoid 
Foreclosure, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2010/04/29/AR2010042904769.html. 
 28. See Merle, supra note 27.  
 29. See id. 
 30. See, e.g., Tim Iacono, Shame on You CNN/Money!, May 23, 2005, http://themessthatgreen 
spanmade.blogspot.com/2005/05/shame-on-you-cnnmoney_23.html. 
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interest rates maintained by the Fed, the bubble was practically guaranteed 
by those forms of market efficiency and individual rationality. Widespread 
confusion on these points—on bubbles‘ compatibility with market 
efficiency and individual rationality—Part II argues, accounts for our 
failures both to have prevented the recent tech stock and real estate 
bubbles, and for our failure effectively to manage their inevitable 
collapses.
31
 
Part III begins the transition to the question of how we should manage 
the mentioned collapse in the short term. It briefly reprises the story of the 
paired stock and real estate bubbles of the late 1920s, then that of how the 
Hoover and Roosevelt Administrations dealt with the fallout once that pair 
of bubbles had burst. In particular, it highlights the role of the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) (established 1932 and 1934), as well as their recently 
renationalized government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) sibling, Fannie 
Mae (established 1938), in reversing the plunge and stabilizing housing 
markets thereafter. That was an absolute prerequisite to arresting the Great 
Depression itself—it set a firm floor.  
Part III also briefly reprises, in broad outline, the complementary 
system of broader financial regulation put into place during those years—
the Banking Acts of 1932 and 1933, the Securities and Securities 
Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, and the Investment Company and 
Investment Advisors Acts of 1940. It emphasizes the sense in which this 
regime constituted one seamless web that critically complemented the new 
system of mortgage finance put into place in those years. Part III also 
emphasizes how departures from that delicately balanced regime since the 
1990s have been nothing less than returns to that late 1920s world, whose 
crashing and burning necessitated the system‘s establishment by Hoover 
and Roosevelt in the first place. 
Part IV turns from the lessons of the recent and not-so-recent past to 
the needs of the present. It lays out both short-term and long-term 
remedies for our present afflictions. It first prescribes how to employ the 
FHA and its newly renationalized siblings Fannie and Freddie to stabilize 
and restore value to the housing and, thereby, the securities markets, just 
as they did from the 1930s to the late 1990s.
32
 It then prescribes an 
 
 
 31. I elaborate this point in Part II.A. The short-playing version is that, in view of the theoretical 
attractions and empirical corroborations of bounded rationality and markets‘ informational efficiency, 
anything thought incompatible with these phenomena is thought impossible. It is the premise shared by 
these thoughts—the incompatibility—that has been erroneous.  
 32. Technically, Freddie was founded in 1970 to compete with Fannie. But I shall occasionally 
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integrated sequence of incremental updatings that must be made to our 
system of financial regulation conceived as a whole, to address new risks 
occasioned by new forms of finance developed in the past decade. 
Fragmented, piecemeal financial regulation is not viable in a world of fast-
paced financial innovation and integrated financial services.
33
 The 
regulatory web must be seamless. Above all, it must afford means of 
modulating the ever potentially violent swings of the debt-credit cycle.
34
  
Each of the updatings urged in this Article constitutes either a 
restoration, or a straightforward and minimal extension to currently 
unregulated sub-industries, of some familiar and uncontroversial mode of 
regulation that served very well from the 1930s until recently. In that 
sense, this Article urges less radical change than a return to who, not long 
ago, we were. On that note, Part V then concludes and looks forward.  
II. THIS OLD HOUSE‘S CRACKED FOUNDATIONS: WHERE WE ARE AND 
HOW WE GOT HERE 
There no longer seems to be serious doubt that asset price bubbles can 
occur, or that the United States is now in the midst of a very large stock, 
and then real estate, bubble‘s collapse.35 Nor does anyone seem now to 
doubt that the United States‘ and world financial systems‘ present woes 
are somehow rooted in that two-staged collapse.
36
 Where most 
disagreement persists is in respect of two ancillary questions.  
The first of those questions is whether anything can be done about asset 
price bubbles. Some still maintain that euphoric asset price rises—like 
 
 
lump the two institutions together in speaking of the pre-1970 regime for simplicity‘s sake. For more 
on this history, see infra Part III. 
 33. This is one continuing thread of HOCKETT, FINANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND 
FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 4.  
 34. For more on this cycle—a staple of the venerable monetary theories of Wicksell, Fisher, 
Keynes, Schumpeter, and Minsky, as well as of the more recent theories of Bernanke and Gertler on 
the one hand, and Stiglitz and Greenwald on the other—see infra Part II.  
 35. There is a history of belief that market efficiency precludes asset bubbles, hence that one 
must believe in one or the other, not both. See, e.g., the views of Eugene Fama, one of the principal 
developers of the ECMH, on the impossibility of bubbles. Interview by Douglas Clement with Eugene 
Fama (Nov. 2, 2007), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display. 
cfm?id=1134; Interview by John Cassidy with Eugene Fama (Jan. 13, 2010), available at http:// 
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/01/interview-with-eugene-fama.html. Not so, as I 
will argue below. The informational efficiency widely thought to be characteristic of liquid capital 
markets—be it the so-called ―strong,‖ ―semi-strong,‖ or ―weak‖ form of which one speaks—is quite 
compatible with the presence of asset bubbles, just as it is with consumer price inflation. The reason is 
that bubbles grow around a Knightian form of uncertainty. There simply is not information in this case 
of the sort that can find expression in asset prices.  
 36. But see the peculiar views of Eugene Fama, supra note 35. 
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those in the values of tech stocks, then U.S. residential real estate—from 
the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s cannot be foreseen or avoided.
37
  
The second question is whether addressing the ongoing mortgage crisis 
is the best means—or even an effective means—of defusing the ongoing, 
now much more generalized, financial crisis and downturn we are 
experiencing. Some argue that the problem has spread so far outward that 
mortgage foreclosures no longer matter.
38
  
This Part argues that these two questions should be buried, along with 
those earlier questions concerning the possibility of asset bubbles in 
general and the actuality of a now-deflating real estate bubble, in 
particular. It first briefly schematizes the structure of that process through 
which asset price bubbles typically develop, inflate, and then burst. This 
structure, it argues, is that of a classic collective action problem. The 
process it structures is therefore compatible with individual rationality and 
aggregative market-informational efficiency.
39
 The process is also 
structured in such a way that, no matter how many derivative financial 
contracts might be drawn into the vortex during an asset price‘s collapse, 
the underlying asset itself remains always the best lever through which to 
arrest the collapse.
40
  
After structurally characterizing the nature of asset price bubbles and 
bursts, Part II quickly sketches the conforming structure of our recent tech 
stock and housing price bubbles. It shows them to be ―textbook cases‖ of 
that schema laid out in its first section. Finally, and relatedly, this Part 
shows both how readily verifiable the presence of our recent bubble was, 
and how critical it is to address its aftermath now if we would forestall a 
very long, 1930s-style downturn. That will set the stage for the short-term 
and long-term ―home repairs,‖ elaborated later in the Article. 
 
 
 37. See, e.g., Hearing on Regulation of the Financial Sector Before the Committee of Senate 
Congressional Oversight Panel, Jan. 14, 2009 (statement of Marc Summerlin, Managing Member and 
Co-Founder, Lindsey Group), available at http://www.knowledgeplex.org/news/2901951.html; see 
also Joe Average, Collateral Damage, Oct. 2007, http://www.gold-eagle.com/editorials_05/swagell 
100707.html.  
 38. See, e.g., Jon Hilsenrath, Serena Ng & Damian Paletta, Worst Crisis Since ‗30s, With No End 
Yet in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122169 
431617549947.html. 
 39. This is not to say there was no irrationality or inefficiency in our recent bubble and burst. It is 
only to say that one need not deny rationality or efficiency to assert the occurrence of bubbles and 
bursts. That is important because many who have failed to see bubbles‘ development appear to have 
willfully blinded themselves to such developments, out of a mistaken belief that rationality and 
efficiency, which these folk are at pains to affirm, somehow exclude bubbles and bursts.  
 40. See infra Part IV.A. 
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A. Bubbles Happen: Of Beautiful Babies, Ponzi Processes, and Minsky 
Moments  
Even if few now deny that speculative asset bubbles can occur, it is 
nevertheless crucial to understand how they occur. That not only renders 
us more confident that they can occur, but also well situates us to spot 
future such bubbles ahead of their forming. More importantly, it enables 
us to see how to prevent them and, just as importantly, how to minimize 
the devastation wrought by their deflations when they nevertheless come 
and go. 
1. Beautiful Babies: Underlying Assets, Overlying Valuations  
To understand how speculative asset bubbles can and do happen, the 
first thing to note is a defining feature of speculative assets themselves, as 
contrasted to goods and services meant for consumption. In ordinary 
markets for consumer goods and services, pricing typically conforms to 
the familiar ―laws‖ of supply and demand.41 Consumers buy more, sellers 
receive that ―demand signal,‖ and prices begin to go up. Prices go up, 
consumers and producers receive that ―price signal,‖ and thus begin to 
consume less, produce more, or both. Consumers consume less or 
producers produce more, and prices turn back down. And so on, ad 
tedium.  
The trend is the thing in this picture—the axis along which the 
oscillations occur. The system, in general, tends toward an equilibrium 
price at which supply and demand coincide and the markets thus clear.
42
 
That is the case even if the market-clearing price is, in some cases, an oft-
moving target—owing, for example, to regular changes in tastes or 
production cost functions.
43
 The point is the equilibrating tendency. 
Speculative assets, as distinguished from consumed goods and services, 
do not generally conform to the primitive equilibrium model, familiar to 
price theory, just rehearsed. Even if under some circumstances—or for 
certain intervals over an individual‘s demand function—one‘s demand for 
an asset inversely correlates to its price, under other circumstances or over 
 
 
 41. It is, of course, telling that goods that thus conform are called ―normal goods.‖ There are, of 
course, abnormal goods, but these will not detain us here. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE 
THEORY: A PROVISIONAL TEXT (1962); GEORGE JOSEPH STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE (3d ed. 
1966). Or see any introductory or intermediate text on what now is more often called 
―microeconomics.‖  
 42. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 41; STIGLER, supra note 41. 
 43. FRIEDMAN, supra note 41; STIGLER, supra note 41. 
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other intervals, that demand can be an increasing function of price. The 
circumstances and intervals in question are not hard to see; if the asset 
looks to be all the time rising in value, and the prospective buyer is doing 
the looking, the buyer can at some point begin to demand more of the asset 
precisely because she anticipates further such rises in market value. In 
such cases she acts as a would-be rentier. She is after rents or quasi-rents, 
rather than inexpensive consumption.  
During times of protracted inflation, such as those experienced by the 
United States during the late 1960s and 1970s, these ―inflationary 
expectations‖ (as they then came canonically to be called) can, of course, 
induce greater purchase rates even of consumer goods and services, rather 
than solely of durable assets.
44
 Indeed, it is individually rational for 
consumers to stock up on such goods, and to bring forward their plans to 
consume such services, in these circumstances. That is precisely why 
periods of consumer price inflation are so vexing. They are ―prisoner‘s 
dilemma‖-type situations; individual rationality and collective optimality 
diverge in them. One point I shall emphasize below is that speculative 
asset bubbles need be no different; they, too, are collective dysfunctions 
built up on nonpathological individual functions—demand functions. They 
are cases of rational-expectations-fueled price inflation.  
Now, in the interest of strengthening the comparison just offered, we 
should note that there is a sense in which behavior undertaken in explicit 
response to inflationary expectations is ―speculative,‖ even when the items 
procured are goods and services purchased for consumption. One is in 
such cases, after all, making money-spending decisions ―on spec‖—on 
speculation that the items in question will continue to rise in price. But this 
manner of positive price-elasticity of demand tends nevertheless to be 
naturally limited by either the limited shelf-lives, space required for 
stockpiling, or other costs occasioned by storing the items in question 
when those items are not durable assets, but consumer goods. Moreover 
and relatedly, apart from periods of consumer ―hyperinflation,‖ most 
purchases of goods and services in these inflationary-expectations 
situations are made with a view still to consuming in the future that which 
is purchased, rather than turning a profit through sale. 
The hallmark of a ―pure‖ speculative asset price bubble, then, is just 
this: Here the price inflation in question has indeed morphed into 
 
 
 44. See, e.g., GEORGE W. EVANS & SEPPO HONKAPOHJA, LEARNING AND EXPECTATIONS IN 
MACROECONOMICS (2001). The same effect is discernible, of course, in markets for consumer goods 
during times of consumer inflation. Those who ―stock up‖ on canned soup while prices are rising are 
seeking to be soup-rentiers.  
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―hyperinflation,‖ and the asset in question is easily stored for much later 
use or, more likely, for resale.
45
 The purchaser thus purchases not with a 
view simply to saving herself a few future costs occasioned by items she 
plans in the short or the medium term to consume, but with a view 
expressly to realizing money profits or capital gains. The speculative and 
consumption motives for purchase no longer meld in these cases. The 
motive is ―pure speculation,‖ undertaken with a view to realizing 
pecuniary gains.  
Now, in some of these cases, the gains in question might still be hoped 
to inhere in the assets themselves, which might be durable, readily 
retained, and such as to render their owners more pleased or proud when 
they grow in value. In other cases, the purchaser might enjoy something 
like that which economists call ―wealth‖ effects wrought by appreciation 
of speculative assets—effects which can spill into the broader economy 
through many channels, e.g., greater ―consumer confidence‖ and 
consequent willingness to spend on the part of the newly wealthy, or a 
greater amount of secured debt that the new wealth can attract.
46
  
But more often than not, the gains that are sought during speculative 
asset price rises are the margins between purchase and sale prices that 
people aim to recoup by reselling precisely that which they purchase. In 
the realm of real estate, this category of market participant would include, 
for example, those who intend to ―flip‖ homes, rather than reside in or take 
―reverse‖ mortgages on them for purposes of consumption.47 It is people 
with this sort of aim—the ―pure speculators‖—who add the most fuel to 
our speculative asset price bubbles as the portion of trading behavior they 
account for grows.
48
 For their aim is to profit precisely by, in effect, 
betting on the trading behavior of other market participants, thus 
amplifying effects upon prices wrought by those people.  
 
 
 45. There can, of course, also be borderline cases. The tulip bulbs figuring into the Dutch 
―Tulipmania,‖ for example, were easily stored while their prices continued to rise. Purchasers, 
moreover, could ―consume‖—retain, plant, and grow—some of their acquisitions, while selling the 
remainder or holding on to them with a view to selling later. On this particular mania, see CHARLES 
MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (1841), a classic on 
the subject. For a more recent telling, see ANNE GOLDGAR, TULIPMANIA: MONEY, HONOR, AND 
KNOWLEDGE IN THE DUTCH GOLDEN AGE (2007).  
 46. See, e.g., ERIC BELSKY & JOEL PRAKKEN, HOUSING WEALTH EFFECTS: HOUSING‘S IMPACT 
ON WEALTH ACCUMULATION, WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMER SPENDING (2004), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/w04-13.pdf. 
 47. I shall say more about ―flipping‖ below. Sizeable numbers of people—including savvy 
undergraduates at elite universities—began purchasing homes with a view to quick resale in the early 
2000s.  
 48. See, e.g., KINDLEBERGER & ALIBAR, supra note 1, at 37.  
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John Maynard Keynes, a man who made multiple fortunes on, and 
never ceased to be, fascinated by securities markets, appears to have been 
one of the first economists proper to have singled out that feature of 
speculative asset markets to which I am drawing attention.
49
 He likened 
such markets to the ―Beautiful Baby‖ contests run in his day by the British 
press.
50
 In such contests, a newspaper would publish the photographs of a 
number of candidate children. Readers were asked to vote upon those 
babies they thought most ―beautiful.‖ Those who had voted on photos that 
received the most votes would then win prizes.
51
 It did not take long, 
Keynes observed, for players to cease voting for babies whom they 
themselves actually found beautiful.
52
 They commenced voting instead for 
the babies whom they reckoned others would find beautiful.  
If the aim is to win prizes, of course, this is the rational thing for the 
voter to do. That fact bears noting because it affords means of readily 
seeing how asset price bubbles may develop even in informationally 
efficient markets whose actors are individually rational.
53
  
In effect, with the ―Beautiful Baby‖ analogy, Keynes was underscoring 
an analogue to what is now often labeled the elusive distinction between 
―real,‖ long-term, ―fundamental‖ values of market-traded assets on the one 
hand—the sort of value extolled not so long ago by Benjamin Graham, 
and extolled to this day by Graham‘s best-known disciple, Warren 
Buffett
54—and more ephemeral, even whimsical, ―market‖ values on the 
other. Some people appear to believe that these two takes on value are 
 
 
 49. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND 
MONEY (1936). I say ―economist proper‖ because others prior to Keynes, who wrote before there was 
any distinct discipline known as ―economics,‖ also have noted these features of speculative asset 
bubbles. See, e.g., JOSEPH DE LA VEGA, CONFUSIÓN DE CONFUSIONES (1688) (on the speculative 
excesses of seventeenth-century Amsterdam exchanges).  
 Until relatively recent years, and even to a certain degree now, there has been a regrettable divide 
between so-called ―economics‖ on the one hand, and so-called ―finance‖ on the other. A vestige of that 
divide is the continuing tendency of financial economists to be found mainly in business schools, with 
economists in colleges of arts and science. The former were long disparaged as ―vocational‖ types by 
the latter. That began to change with the burgeoning of sophisticated financial decision making and 
price models in the 1970s. The new regime received an imprimatur of sorts when financial economists 
began winning Nobel prizes in the 1990s. Keynes—and, to a certain extent, Hicks—were ahead of 
their time as economists in their taking seriously the institutional and structural features of financial 
markets as determinants of economic performance. See J.R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL: AN INQUIRY 
INTO SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC THEORY (1939); KEYNES, supra note 49. 
 50. See KEYNES, supra note 49, at 156.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 54. See BENJAMIN GRAHAM, SECURITY ANALYSIS (1962); BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE 
INTELLIGENT INVESTOR: A BOOK OF PRACTICAL COUNSEL (1959); see also ALICE SCHROEDER, THE 
SNOWBALL: WARREN BUFFETT AND THE BUSINESS OF LIFE (2008). 
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radically incompatible, and to eschew the idea of ―fundamental‖ value in 
consequence.
55
 That, in turn, leads them to think that a speculative asset 
price bubble—which is always the product of ―market,‖ not ―fundamental‖ 
value—is either impossible or undetectable.56 But those who view things 
this way simply suffer, I think, a confusion concerning the relation 
between individual rationality on the one hand, and the institutions 
through which rational actions aggregate into collective outcomes on the 
other.
57
 Let me explain.  
It can of course be difficult, at any particular moment, to draw sharp 
and clear lines between ―market‖ and ―fundamental‖ value. That is so just 
as ―manias‖ for things like tulips can straddle the divide between 
consumer and asset price inflation,
58
 and as thinkers as clever as the 
classical political economists could find themselves sometimes puzzling 
over how to distinguish between what used to be called ―use‖ and 
―exchange‖ value.59 This same difficulty of clear line-drawing is also the 
reason why there can so often be controversy over whether financial 
institutions‘ asset portfolios should be required to be regularly ―marked-to-
market‖ on the one hand, or ―book-valued,‖ ―discounted cashflow-
valued,‖ or otherwise less ―mood-swingingly‖ valued on the other.60  
Nevertheless, I shall argue, the distinction is tractable in principle, as 
well as in regulatory practice. And it is important, for purposes of 
 
 
 55. See, e.g., sources cites supra note 35. See generally Robert D. Coleman, Evolution of Stock 
Pricing, 2006, http://www.numeraire.com/download/EvolutionStockPricing.pdf. 
 56. See, e.g., Greenspan, supra note 18; see also supra notes 35, 37. Greenspan, for his part, 
attributes the view also to Robert Rubin, President Clinton‘s second Treasury Secretary. See ALAN 
GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW WORLD 218 (2007).  
 57. More careful attention to such institutions is the hallmark of so-called ―new institutional‖ 
theories of monetary and financial economics, such as those cited supra note 20 and accompanying 
text.  
 58. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
 59. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 61 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1994) (1776); 
DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 33 (Cosimo Classics 2006) 
(1817).  
 60. See, e.g., Steve Forbes, Obama Repeats Bush's Worst Market Mistakes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 
2009, at A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123630304198047321.html; Floyd Norris, 
Bankers Say Rules Are the Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at B1, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/03/13/business/economy/13norris.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, 
SEC Office of the Chief Accountant and FASB Staff Clarifications on Fair Value Accounting, No. 
2008-234 (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-234.htm; Brooke Colin 
Barr, Fair Value: The Pragmatic Solution, CNNMONEY.COM, Nov. 21, 2008, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/21/news/fair.value.compromise.fortune/index.htm?postversion=200811
2109http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/21/news/fair.value.com; Sopelsa, Former FDIC Chair Blames 
SEC for Credit Crunch, CNBC.COM, Oct. 9, 2008, available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/27100454. I 
shall recommend that a ―basket‖ of valuation methods be employed simultaneously, at least for 
regulatory purposes. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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understanding the dynamics, inner workings, and regulatability of 
speculative asset bubbles, to be mindful both of the distinction and of the 
linkage connecting its terms. For it is precisely by tracking short- to 
medium-term divergences between apparent fundamental value as 
measured by reference to solid information on the one hand, and more 
volatile market value as determined in part by mere rumor and ―herd 
behavior‖ in the face of uncertainty on the other, that regulators can spot 
bubbles forming and shrink them before they grow contagiously 
dangerous.  
How, then, should we think of, then track, this distinction? For the 
present, it will be useful to think of the relation between the two aspects of 
value under the single aspect of this simile: ―Fundamental‖ value is like 
heavy liquid at the bottom of a flask. ―Market‖ value is then like a lighter 
liquid that lies over it. Movements of the lighter fluid cannot help but be 
affected by movements of the heavier, nor can they help but be partly 
anchored by the inertial forces exerted by the latter. But movements of the 
lighter fluid also are prone to be brought on independently of, as well as 
more readily than, movements of the former, and can persist for a time 
before being slowed by the slower-moving liquid beneath. More forces, in 
short—even rumors and whims—can move the lighter stuff for brief 
periods, and can move it more frequently and further.  
The light versus heavy liquid simile proves helpful, on reflection, 
because an asset‘s so-called ―fundamental‖ value is just the ―tree‖ of 
possible long-term cash flows it is likely to throw off, as discounted by (a) 
the probabilities assigned to each limb of the tree, (b) money inflation, and 
(c) associated opportunity costs, including consumption deferral and 
cognate determinants of the so-called ―time-value of money.‖61 
Considered assessments of fundamental value thus parsed can, of course, 
change over time because the component discount factors can change, 
particularly as knowledge accumulates through time. But change in this 
case tends to be incremental and gradual, as the just-employed terms 
―considered‖ and ―accumulate‖ tend to suggest, even if sometimes it also 
 
 
 61. There are, of course, often multiple varyingly likely inflation scenarios—―limbs‖—as well, 
and there are opportunity costs additional to that of foregone consumption. Valuation can grow very 
complicated. See generally TOM COPELAND ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE 
VALUE OF COMPANIES (4th ed. 2005); STEPHEN A. ROSS, NEOCLASSICAL FINANCE (2005). We can 
prescind from all that for present purposes. The point is that ―fundamental‖ valuation can be done, that 
it is not mere whistling in the dark, and that market valuations can diverge significantly from such 
―fundamentals‖ for extended temporal intervals even when they remain anchored in them over the 
long run.  
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can be sudden and radical.
62
 Market valuation, by contrast, is generally 
susceptible to much greater volatility, even if nonetheless ultimately 
anchored in and constrained by ―fundamental‖ valuation.63 For there are 
many more determinants of market participants‘ purchasing and selling 
decisions than news bearing upon ―fundamental‖ value alone.64 In 
particular, there is what those participants see other participants doing—
behavior that might, but certainly need not always, be prompted by 
―fundamental‖ considerations.  
Now, as noted above, one need not deny individual rationality to hold 
consumer inflation or asset price bubbles possible. Just so, one need not 
deny markets‘ informational efficiency—not even ―strong-form‖ 
efficiency, let alone the ―weak‖ or ―semi-strong‖ forms that are 
empirically better supported—to distinguish between more volatile 
―market‖ and less volatile ―fundamental‖ asset value.65 One need only 
recognize that asset prices during some periods change more rapidly and 
radically than do valuations conducted pursuant to traditional accounting 
methods, without the latter methods being thereby discredited.
66
  
One can see how this might be upon pausing to ask whether some 
people might sometimes act as what Fischer Black canonically dubbed 
―noise traders.‖67 Those are people who trade, not on the basis of one or 
another bit of information they have received that would seem to bear 
directly upon likely firm payouts in future, but instead on the basis either 
of what they see other traders doing, or on the basis of what they anticipate 
future traders will do. ―Beautiful Baby‖ betting of the Keynesian sort 
mentioned above is noise trading in the requisite sense. And it, like noise 
trading more generally, is among those phenomena that underwrite so-
called ―herd behavior‖ on asset markets.  
―Beautiful Baby‖ betting can also aggregate behavior that is 
individually rational into behavior that proves, in the end, to be 
 
 
 62. Examples would include a sudden discovery that asbestos causes fatal illness, for example; or 
that some new power source is viable. In such cases, the ―fundamental‖ values of certain firms would 
change very quickly.  
 63. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 60. 
 64. Rumors to the effect that an unusually effective CEO has taken ill, for example, or reports 
that Warren Buffett is dumping his shares of some firm, would be cases in point. If such reports turn 
out to be false, or to have been misinterpreted, changes in share price might be canceled out as quickly 
as they occurred.  
 65. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991); Eugene F. 
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). 
 66. To recur to the examples supra note 64: the sudden share price changes mentioned there 
would not impugn the propriety of share valuation methods that attended to ―fundamentals‖ rather than 
immediate market-valuation. 
 67. Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 529–30 (1986).  
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collectively pathological. It affords the stuff, that is to say, of a species of 
coordination problem whose worst sorts of consequences we are 
experiencing now. It is time now we turned to the ―game‖ structure of this 
form of collective action problem. 
2. Ponzi Processes: There Need Be No Ponzi 
Trading of the ―Beautiful Baby‖ variety just sketched, particularly 
when easily levered by inexpensive borrowing, generally constitutes or 
compounds the effects of the underlying mechanism of the prototypical 
speculative asset bubble—a mechanism that stems from the just-discussed 
nature of speculative assets and purchases themselves. The reason is that 
such trading can quickly come to bear the familiar structure of ―chain 
letter,‖ ―pyramid,‖ or ―Ponzi‖-style schemes—schemes that capitalize on 
some peoples‘ propensities to make purchasing decisions less on the basis 
of traded assets themselves than on the basis of what they see or anticipate 
other people doing.
68
 Ponzi or pyramid dynamics seem to be operative in 
all of the most devastating speculative asset price bubbles and bursts on 
record.
69
  
It is crucial at the outset to be clear on the fact that there need be no 
Ponzi or scheme in these cases. Though the ―fire,‖ to grow large, needs the 
fuel of cheap credit or leverage, hence the complicity of influential actors, 
the initial combustion is, in a certain sense, typically ―spontaneous.‖ It 
need not be deliberately set, nor need the spark that ignites it be in any 
sense ill-prompted or ill-motivated. The ongoing Ponzi process, moreover, 
once underway, need involve no irrationality on the part of individual 
participants in the markets; indeed, quite the contrary. The problem is the 
fuel. The relevant form of irrationality or negligence, if any there be, is 
that of the overseer charged with controlling the fuel, when s/he is deluded 
or willfully blind to the fact that the fire is started and soon might grow out 
of control.  
Where institutional structures operate in a manner that aggregates 
instances of individual rationality into collective irrationality—or what is 
the same thing, where our problem is a straightforward collective action 
problem—the only irrational agents ―we‖ need collectively worry about 
 
 
 68. See, e.g., SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 9, at 64–67 (discussing ―naturally 
occurring Ponzi processes‖). 
 69. A still-unsurpassed narratival catalogue of such cases through financial history is 
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1. Now in its fifth edition with a co-author, the work finds 
occasional citation below.  
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are those charged with acting on behalf of the collectivity itself. Collective 
irrationality demands a rationally acting collective actor—a good 
regulator. 
Do these claims not fly in the face of recent orthodoxy? How can one 
say such things? Here is how: with a nice, clean-cut game from the ‗50s. 
Imagine, then, a game of automotive ―chicken‖ like that played in Rebel 
Without a Cause,
70
 but with a few variations to pick up some salient 
features of present-day asset markets. James Dean and the punk who has 
provoked him are still poised to drag race in the direction of a cliff‘s 
edge.
71
 He who bails from his Chevy first, moreover, will still lose the 
game.
72
 But in contrast to the race as it occurred in the film, these three 
amendments are made to the rules of the game: First, the drivers, who can 
now number more than just two, are forward-wise blindfolded before they 
can see how far the cars are from the cliff. They can see only each other, 
peripherally; they do not know how far they are from the cliff‘s edge.73  
Second, the drivers are paid prize money by the foot, so to speak, so 
long as they do not drive over the cliff. The more ground you cover, in 
other words, short of driving over, the more money you clear.
74
 You are 
also, moreover, permitted to make side bets with others as to your and 
your opponents‘ future performances, assuming that you can find 
counterparties. These bets might be for portions of your prize money, but 
also might be for assets you hold prior to playing the game; some of them 
might even hedge against loss prospects you face, much as insurance 
policies do.
75
 If you drive over the cliff, then, you might lose some or all 
of your winnings and even more, or you might lose very little, if anything. 
And none of this is certain, for reasons I provide next.  
Finally, third, no driver will be killed or maimed if he goes off the cliff. 
There‘s a net—perhaps a number of differently placed nets—down below. 
The driver might also be monetarily ―bailed out‖ up to some amount in the 
end, in the sense that he might be permitted to keep some, perhaps even a 
lot, of his total money winnings, game winnings, and side-bet winnings—
should he go over the cliff. (We might think of differently placed nets as 
 
 
 70. REBEL WITHOUT A CAUSE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1955). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. They do not know when the bubble will burst, in other words—only that, at some point, it 
will. They know that anyone who keeps driving without ever stopping will go over the cliff. But all 
they can see for the moment is each other.  
 74. The longer you ride the bubble up, the more money you will make, provided you get out 
before the thing bursts.  
 75. The intended analogy here is to derivative contracts.  
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different loss amounts.) But he does not know how much, if indeed any, 
he might get to keep.
76
 Nor does he know how far he will fall before 
reaching the net. There might be some butterflies on the way down.
77
 
Now, this is the thing to ask about this strange game: Is there any 
canon of rationality pursuant to which those who go over the cliff can 
definitively be judged to have been less rational than those who do not? 
Are losers, or any participants, clearly less rational than others? I think the 
answer is no. For there seem to be no grounds for decision making here 
other than those afforded by risk-taste. And risk-taste is no different from 
wine-taste or beer-taste where standard-form rationality is concerned.
78
  
Moreover, consider now those who do not quite reach the cliff‘s side, 
but nevertheless come closer to that edge than do others: if the aim is to 
win more, will not they seem in hindsight to have been in a certain sense 
―more rational,‖ sensible, or savvy than others, notwithstanding their 
having drawn closer to the uncertain ―calamity‖ that is the drive-over?79 
We certainly seem often to make judgments of that sort, with the benefit 
of hindsight at any rate.  
Further questions now press themselves on us: Won‘t anyone who 
refuses to play the game at all, if she or he has the opportunity, seem a bit 
quirky, eccentric, or backward—like one who bans laptops in 
classrooms—not to take part in it, at least for a few feet of driving?80 And 
won‘t that especially seem so when ―everyone else‖ seems to be playing or 
queuing up to play? Won‘t that be so particularly if, plausibly enough, we 
add a fourth rule to the game, to the effect that, at least short of driving 
over the cliff, each driver‘s prize money per driven foot will be an 
increasing function of the number of wannabe players queued up in the 
bullpen waiting to drive next?
81
 Indeed, add a fifth rule, to the effect that 
 
 
 76. For he lacks knowledge not only as to what the game administrators will be willing to do, 
bailout-wise, but also as to how much they might be able to confiscate from other players and 
nonplayers to make some cliff-diving players whole or more whole.  
 77. It is a commonplace among central bankers that bailouts must be attended by uncertainty, lest 
actors succumb to moral hazard and, in the certainty that they will be rescued, act in effect to bring on 
the catastrophe from whence they need to be bailed out. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cosimano, The Banking 
Industry under Uncertain Monetary Policy, 12 J. BANKING & FIN. 117, 123–24 (1998); Thomas F. 
Cosimano & John B. Van Huyck, Central Bank Secrecy, Interest Rates, and Monetary Control, 31 
ECON. INQUIRY 370 (1993). 
 78. This is, of course, the standard ―liberal,‖ ―instrumental,‖ or ―formal‖ conception of 
rationality. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 26 (1978) (1926).  
 79. ―In a certain sense‖ because only in hindsight. For, in hindsight, there is sufficient 
information to assume, erroneously, that there was more than risk-taste at play in the game.  
 80. Same caveat as per the previous footnote applies.  
 81. Here is where the Ponzi element kicks in. The more coming in at the back end, the more 
money won by the front-enders—and those who enter the queue do so in express anticipation that 
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the people who win least on the way—those who drive slowly, in other 
words—are driven off the board and lose everything, or are in their 
timidity violating fiduciary duties that they owe to clients who bet on 
them, and it will seem positively ―crazy‖ not to take part and run hard.82  
The game I have described here in essence is just that of any asset 
market during times of so-called ―speculative mania.‖83 Once an asset 
price bubble is underway in today‘s informational environment, there 
seems little, if any, way of knowing just when it will burst or begin to 
deflate. (I will hedge that remark in a moment.) Prospective and actual 
participants accordingly face what F. Knight would have called radical 
―uncertainty,‖ as distinguished from mere ―risk.‖84 That is to say, they not 
only do not know what particular outcomes will actually ―come out,‖ but 
also lack any information concerning probability distributions among 
apparently possible outcomes.
85
 They are in a complete informational 
vacuum. In consequence, even informationally efficient markets—that is, 
those that impound price-relevant information very quickly through the 
mechanism of trading behavior by market participants—will afford no 
helpful clues.  
Under these epistemic circumstances, it is not clearly irrational to play 
the game, at least for an indefinite while—particularly when there seems a 
good chance that casualties will be made partly or fully whole by a lender, 
or unconditional provider, ―of last resort.‖86 Indeed it seems almost 
irrational or eccentric not to play if one can, particularly while so many 
 
 
many more will be coming in behind them. Many thanks to Scott Sakiyama for encouraging me to 
draw out this feature of the Ponzi structure. 
 82. John Geanakoplos, per his role with the Ellington Group Hedge Fund, speaks compellingly 
of how quickly the fund lost its clients when it chose to refrain from participating in the real estate 
bubble of the early 2000s. Email from John Geanakoplos, Professor of Econ., Yale Univ., to Robert 
Hockett, Professor of Law, Cornell Univ., February 16, 2009 (on file with author).  
 83. There are other nice names in the literature, some of venerable vintage. Adam Smith and 
contemporaries referred to ―over-trading.‖ See, e.g., KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 28–
33. What invariably followed, these folks called ―revulsion‖ and ―discredit.‖ Id. It was as if they were 
describing the aftermath of a bender. Germans spoke of a Torschlusspanik—a ―door shut panic.‖ Id. at 
28.  
 84. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). The same form of uncertainty 
figures prominently not only in KEYNES, supra note 49, but also in his much earlier Treatise on 
Probability, largely written during the teens of the twentieth century, though not published until 1923. 
See, e.g., ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 1883–1946: ECONOMIST, PHILOSOPHER, 
STATESMAN (2003).  
 85. See sources cited supra note 84. This form of uncertainty lies at the heart of Keynes‘s theory 
of liquidity preference, and thus the rate of interest—a fact of which ―neoclassical synthesizers‖ of 
Keynes from Hicks onward, in contrast to the sage James Tobin, lost sight.  
 86. Hence, of course, the familiar moral hazard concern invariably raised in connection with 
bailouts and the lender of last resort function. For more on the ―lender of last resort‖ function, see, e.g., 
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 225–74. 
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others are playing and winning and driving out of business those few who 
will not go along for the ride. It even seems rational to draw quite as close 
to the cliff as one can, particularly when one might plausibly assume that 
there will be some sign that she is nearing the cliff—a sudden loss of 
altitude, say, at the front end of that Chevy whose rear passenger window 
is flush with her driver‘s seat window. A highly respected Fed Chairman, 
after all—a Chairman, moreover, widely celebrated as a stalwart of market 
efficiency—has in effect told her as much.87  
Note, moreover, that if you have got into the game fairly early, so that 
there are many queued up behind you and your prospective winnings 
accordingly have come to look very impressive, you will be especially 
reasonably tempted to stay on for a while. And you will be all the more 
seemingly reasonably tempted if the game becomes something of a cult 
hit. For your temptation will be vindicated by the proverbial ―wisdom of 
crowds‖—in this case, the crowds both of wannabe players queued up 
behind you, and of chattering talk-show guests, magazine articles, and 
mass-market paperback books. And if, like most people, you are relatively 
confident in your own abilities relative to those of others, you will simply 
be all the more tempted to play.
88
  
Now, as noted a moment ago, what I have laid out here in stylized 
fashion is just the ―game‖ structure of most so-called ―speculative 
manias.‖ All I have left out is what gets the game going, a few flourishes 
inapplicable to James Dean, and the matter of what those who act on 
behalf of the collectivity—the regulators—ought to do about the collective 
pathology into which these decentralized individually rational behaviors 
can aggregate. Let‘s fill out the picture a bit.  
Typically what happens in real-life asset price bubbles is this: First 
comes the familiar ―exogenous shock.‖89 Some new discovery, invention, 
technology, or other change points toward new profit-making 
 
 
 87. Chairman Greenspan notoriously said in 2004 that home buyers would be irrationally 
foregoing sizeable capital gains were they to forego ballooning adjustable rate mortgages. See 
Greenspan Says Personal Debt Is Mitigated by Housing Value, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at C11, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/24/business/24fed.html?ex=1231131600&en=8882 
db4e0fc674da&ei=5070. For more on this, see infra Part II.A.3. 
 88. This well-known tendency is documented in a large body of psychological studies. It is not 
clearly irrational. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff et al., Knowing with Certainty: The Appropriateness of 
Extreme Confidence, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 552 (1977). 
For a popularly accessible survey, see HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2000).  
 89. See, e.g., HYMAN P. MINSKY, The Financial Instability Hypothesis, in CAN ―IT‖ HAPPEN 
AGAIN? ESSAYS IN INSTABILITY AND FINANCE (1982); see also KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 
1, at 25–30.  
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opportunities in the future. It might be the steam engine, the railroads, the 
automobile, the telegraph, the mainframe, or desktop or laptop computer. 
It might even be some new financial technology, we will see. Or a 
demographic change tending to spark more demand for some good or 
service.  
Second, credit and equity investment begin reasonably flowing toward 
those who produce, sell, or otherwise appear poised to profit by the new 
opportunities in question.
90
 The ―fundamentals‖ of such investments, after 
all, look very promising. At least that is so for a while. And so they attract 
capital.  
Third, demand for credit by those wishing to invest in the new 
industries in question begins to grow, and lenders grow more and more 
willing to oblige in exchange for a piece of the action.
91
 They do so first 
on the security of various unrelated forms of collateral, then on the 
underlying assets themselves, then in time upon less, little, or no security 
at all. In short, ―leverage‖ rates grow first as optimism, and then as Ponzi-
style self-fulfilling optimism, begin spreading or ―cascading.‖92  
Once such increasingly generalized optimism and then self-fulfilling 
optimism kicks in, the collateralized assets that prompt spiked investment 
in the first place begin growing in value in virtue of that optimism itself, 
meaning that they can underwrite more borrowing.
93
 Signs of a ―positive 
feedback loop‖ begin to emerge: Demand drives levered purchases, which 
drive up speculative asset prices, which drive further demand—just as the 
characterization of ―pure‖ speculation in the previous section would lead 
us to expect.
94
  
Finally, the process edges toward pathological territory when 
borrowing flips over entirely from borrowing meant to capitalize on the 
―fundamental value‖ thrown off by the new asset or industry itself, to 
borrowing meant to capitalize upon other people‘s desires thus to 
capitalize—―Beautiful Baby‖ borrowing.95 At that point, there are not 
simply signs of a positive feedback loop; the continuing price rise now is 
just that loop. A Ponzi process has fully kicked in; we are flying on 
afterburners.  
 
 
 90. See sources cited supra note 89. 
 91. Id. 
 92. This is the picture portrayed by some ―new institutionalist‖ theorists of finance. See, e.g., 
STIGLITZ & GREENWALD, supra note 20; see also sources cited supra notes 20, 89. 
 93. See sources cited supra note 89. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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Now, when does the Ponzi portion of the process emerge? The Ponzi 
process kicks in once a ―critical mass‖ of levered purchasers of the asset in 
question coalesces.
96
 The mass is ―critical‖ in the sense that levered 
purchasers no longer borrow cheaply simply in order to purchase the asset 
in question on favorable terms with a view to consumption or interest or 
dividend streams: they borrow now also—and increasingly—with a view 
specifically to purchase for resale, in the manner described in connection 
with ―speculative assets‖ in the previous section. Now, that is to say, 
levered purchasers are effectively arbitraging; they are legging the spread 
between borrowing rates and capital appreciation rates—in effect driving 
the ―equity premium‖ that has so ―puzzled‖ some financial theorists.97 
Once that occurs, the bubble has formed and begins to inflate very 
quickly.
98
 Credit-enabled ―pure speculation‖ of the sort described in the 
previous section is now underway. 
Now, crucially, as the process veers into this self-reinforcing ―positive 
feedback‖ phase, no authority—in particular, no central bank—charged 
with controlling the money supply and/or lending or leverage rates acts on 
behalf of the collectivity to tighten up credit or levering. Nobody acts, that 
is to say, to spare us the collective pathology toward which our 
decentralized rational actions tend to aggregate. More and more people—
even undergraduates or ―Mom and Pop‖ types—begin to make use of 
cheap credit to purchase and ―flip‖ assets, even houses, of all things.  
Popular culture begins to reflect these developments too. ―Market-
watching‖ networks like CNBC, and programs like ―Market Place‖ and 
―The Motley Fool,‖ begin to proliferate on radio and television. ―How to‖ 
books spread over the shelves in the pop-finance sections of bookstores. 
The bubble, under a less-disparaging name, becomes an object of popular 
attention, even rabid or morbid fascination. Media pundits increasingly 
talk about it—even on nonfinance programs. ―Experts‖ on generalist talk 
shows extol and marvel over it. People find themselves increasingly told 
that they would be foolish not to take part in the party—they will be 
―leaving money on the table.‖  
 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. The ―equity premium puzzle‖ that has so vexed some financial theorists is actually not all 
that puzzling once we notice the prevalence of asset price bubbles. The rate of asset price inflation 
simply outruns that of borrowing costs for as long as the bubble inflates. For more on these matters, 
see, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium 
Puzzle, 110 Q.J. ECON. 73 (1995); Narayana R. Kocherlakota, The Equity Premium: It‘s Still a Puzzle, 
34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 42 (1996); Rajnish Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Premium: A 
Puzzle, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 145 (1985). 
 98. See sources cited supra note 89. 
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As the asset bubble continues to grow, some begin finally—typically 
after a few years—to wonder how long it can last. Opinion eventually 
begins to divide. Some commence talking in ―new era‖ terms, pointing to 
some underlying attribute of the asset or market in question that putatively 
distinguishes it from those associated with previous, purportedly less-
sustainable bubbles. In the case of the tech stock bubble of the late 1990s, 
for example, the novel development was that of new information, 
communications, and computing technologies, which some said rendered 
accelerating growth rates in business productivity inevitable for many 
years to come.
99
 Even Fed Chairman Greenspan, of all people, joined this 
particular ―new paradigm‖ bandwagon—surprisingly soon after his 
widely–quoted, express concern over ―irrational exuberance.‖100  
In other cases, like those more recently of petroleum or real estate, the 
special feature called to attention is the finitude of supply of the asset in 
question, conjoined with the indefinite extensibility of the population that 
will demand it—Ricardian ―marginal land rents‖101 and Malthusian 
―geometric population growth‖ theory102 combined, it would seem. People 
say real estate ―can only go up,‖ or that petroleum prices are bound to 
keep rising. They say it is inevitable, and note that the prices in question 
―have never gone down‖ or have never gone down for more than a few 
quarters. Chairman Greenspan seems to have joined the bandwagon, too, 
as did the bond-rating agencies.
103
 So did the ubiquitous, hyped book titles 
and television programs: The Automatic Millionaire Homeowner, Flip 
That House!, and so on—real titles all.  
It does not seem to be widely appreciated that earlier bubbles, going 
way back, have in all cases featured like forms of ―new era‖ talk to those 
that we have recently endured.
104
 Look back at past manias, and the words 
used ring eerily familiar. Probably the least obscure such case from the 
not-so-distant past is that of Irving Fisher of Yale, by far the most widely 
known and respected American economist of his day, one indeed still 
widely esteemed for the originality of his contributions to monetary theory 
and the theory of index numbers, among other things.
105
 Fisher was, alas, 
 
 
 99. See, e.g., infra note 100. 
 100. See, e.g., Adam Zagorin, Greenspan and His Friends, TIME, Nov. 10, 1997, at 46, 48. 
 101. See RICARDO, supra note 59, at 44–61.  
 102. See T.R. MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON POPULATION (E.P. Dutton 1914) (1798).  
 103. See, e.g., supra note 88; see also infra Part II.B.  
 104. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, for many droll examples.  
 105. See, e.g., IRVING FISHER, THE MAKING OF INDEX NUMBERS: A STUDY OF THEIR VARIETIES, 
TESTS, AND RELIABILITY (1922); IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST: AS DETERMINED BY 
IMPATIENCE TO SPEND INCOME AND OPPORTUNITY TO INVEST IT (1930). 
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what turns out to have been less original when he was widely quoted as 
saying, in October 1929 no less, that ―[s]tock prices have reached what 
looks like a permanently high plateau.‖106  
Esteemed professors of economics at Harvard and Princeton fared little 
better than Fisher that year. Professor Lawrence, at Princeton, averred in 
September that stocks were not overvalued. He then provocatively added, 
as if in anticipation of a book title that would ring popular seventy-five 
years thence, ―[w]here is that group of men with the all-embracing wisdom 
which will entitle them to veto the judgment of th[e] intelligent 
multitude?‖107 The Harvard Econometric Society did not disagree and 
went so far as to say, shortly after the October crash, that ―a severe 
depression like that of 1920–21 is outside the range of probability. We are 
not facing a protracted liquidation.‖108 As Galbraith archly notes, they 
continued to say so right up to the point that the market was liquidated.
109
  
Few, then, seem to notice during periods of speculative mania that 
those plausible long-run trend-lines of the sort upon which ―new era‖ 
stories implicitly trade are perfectly compatible with short-term and even 
medium-term fall backs en route—just as we noted in the previous section 
that the existence of plausible ―fundamental‖ values is perfectly consistent 
with somewhat more volatile, and not necessarily irrational or 
informationally inefficient, market valuations. Most think instead like the 
folk who have noticed that the summer of 2008 was cooler than summer of 
2005, then pronounce global warming a hoax. And they call the few who 
express caution—those who see pyramiding or ―irrational exuberance‖—
―Cassandras‖ or ―Chicken Littles.‖ 
Leverage-wise, the bold, in the meanwhile, grow ever more extended. 
The borrowing that fuels bubbles has been helpfully taxonomized into 
three phases.
110
 During the first phase, borrowers borrow against more- or 
less-assured future cash flows. In the second phase, assured future cash 
flows do not suffice to cover debt repayment obligations; borrowers must 
refinance either by rescheduling prior obligations or undertaking new 
ones. Finally, in the third phase, debt obligations can be covered only if 
the borrower succeeds in selling the asset she purchased with the 
borrowings at a significantly appreciated price.  
 
 
 106. The line is often quoted. In this case, I quote from GALBRAITH, supra note 6, at 70.  
 107. Id. at 70–71. Perhaps an early appeal to ―the wisdom of crowds.‖  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id.  
 110. See sources cited supra note 89; see also IRVING FISHER, THE DEBT DEFLATION THEORY OF 
DEPRESSIONS (1933). 
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Third-phase debt is accordingly sustainable only for as long as the 
market for the asset in question continues to rise, and is forthcoming only 
for as long as lenders believe it will continue to do so. Debt in this case, 
therefore, rests on a spontaneously emergent Ponzi process of the kind 
described above. Once the pool of prospective new entrants to this market 
approaches exhaustion, therefore, such that prices can no longer rise, third-
phase debtors quickly prove to be overexposed, their short positions 
precarious. Asset markets are set for a crash, credit markets for a crunch.  
3. Minsky Moments: What Goes Up Must Come Down the Same 
Pathway 
The three-phased leverage cycle just rehearsed is often associated with 
the writings of Hyman Minsky—often disparaged in his day as precisely 
the sort of Cassandra I mentioned that bubble boosters are prone to 
mock.
111
 In effect, the ―manic‖ hump of the credit cycle that he 
schematized is just the flip side of those depressed ―animal spirits‖ that 
Keynes highlighted as being at work in the slump of the 1930s.
112
 
Minsky‘s signal contribution was to link those depressed spirits diagnosed 
by Keynes symmetrically up with the manic ones that culminate in the 
crashes that occasion them.
113
  
A student of Schumpeter‘s—hence derivatively of Wicksell and indeed 
even Fisher—as well as an enthusiastic interpreter of Keynes, Minsky was 
particularly attentive to the role of credit cycles and debt structures both in 
the run up to, and in the aftermath of, all asset price crashes.
114
 Like 
Fisher, he emphasized the homology between debt-driven asset inflations 
on the one hand, and what amount to debt-canceling ―corrective‖ 
deflations on the other. Only the ―directions‖ change, he maintained; 
structure abides.
115
 Like Schumpeter, moreover, Minsky took this cycling 
to be, in a certain sense, unavoidable in the absence of attentive 
regulation—in effect, ―hard-wired‖ into any capitalist economy featuring 
money, credit, and financial markets.
116
 He accordingly emphasized, like 
 
 
 111. See, e.g., HYMAN P. MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (1975); HYMAN P. MINSKY, 
STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1986). The model that he developed is now popularly known 
as the ―financial instability hypothesis.‖ It is thought to be a competitor to the so-called ―efficient 
capital markets hypothesis.‖ That is a mistake.  
 112. See KEYNES, supra note 49, at 161–63. 
 113. See MINSKY, supra note 89. 
 114. An early version of this picture is presented in Fisher‘s ―Debt Deflation Thesis.‖ See IRVING 
FISHER, BOOMS AND DEPRESSIONS: SOME FIRST PRINCIPLES (1932). 
 115. See sources cited supra note 89. 
 116. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL, AND 
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Keynes, the crucial credit-modulatory role that central banks had to play in 
advanced financial economies in regulating the rate of credit—―Regulation 
as Modulation,‖ I will call it below in Part IV.117  
In effect, then, Minsky viewed the role of the central bank much as did 
William McChesney Martin, Jr., Federal Reserve Chairman from the 
Truman to the early-Nixon eras.
118
 Martin is known as the Federal 
Chairman who first articulated the Treasury Department‘s role as that of 
―leaning against the wind.‖ ―The function of the Federal Reserve,‖ he once 
memorably observed, ―is to take away the punch bowl just as the party is 
getting good.‖119 Why? Because, as just suggested, credit-expansion-
fueled speculative asset bubbles of the sort described above invariably 
cease, then reverse into devastating credit, and then productive 
contractions. Hereof the storied ―Minsky Moment‖ of which we read 
much in the press these days.
120
 
A Minsky Moment is simply an inflection point between exuberantly 
protracted asset price rises on the one hand, and depressively protracted 
asset price falls on the other.
121
 It is reached when the credit-fueled Ponzi 
Process that is the asset price rise has been spent.
122
  
When and how does that happen? In essence, like this: As market 
efficiency advocates themselves emphasize, arbitrage opportunities 
ultimately are exploited.
123
 Spreads accordingly close. The reason is 
obvious; as more and more parties borrow in order to purchase 
appreciating assets, they draw borrowing rates higher.
124
 Rentable money, 
though supply can grow steadily, is not infinitely extensible. Nor is it itself 
a speculative asset. It is, rather, more like those ―normal goods‖ and 
services described in the previous section; as demand continues to grow 
and supply limits come to be approached, prices rise. The spread between 
interest and capital gains narrows. 
 
 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1939); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, 
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942). 
 117. See MINSKY, supra note 89. 
 118. See, e.g., Business: The Martin Era, TIME, Feb. 2, 1970, available at http://www.time. 
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878186,00.html; Melody Petersen, Willian McChesney Martin, 91, 
Dies; Defined Fed‘s Role, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1998, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/ 
29/business/william-mcchesney-martin-91-dies-defined-fed-s-role.html?pagewanted=1. 
 119. MARTIN MAYER, THE FED: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WORLD‘S MOST POWERFUL 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DRIVES THE MARKET 165 (2001).  
 120. Justin Lahart, In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 
2007, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB118736585456901047.html. 
 121. See sources cited supra note 89. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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At some point, those who have been in on the spread-closing game for 
a while begin to take profits and sell out.
125
 As credit limits are closed in 
on, more and more erstwhile market participants do the same. At the same 
time, upper limits on new prospective market participants begin to be 
reached.
126
 At some point, the value of exits comes to equal, then 
flickeringly to exceed, the value of entries.
127
 The inflection point has been 
reached, and so-called ―financial distress‖ ensues.128 The ―distress‖ period 
can last for a while. People begin to contemplate at least the possibility 
that they might not be able to realize sufficient capital gains through asset 
sales to cover the debt obligations they have incurred in taking positions in 
the market in question.  
Often during these periods of flicker, one begins to hear reassuring 
words from political leaders, central bankers, and other financial 
authorities.
129
 The central bank might lower interbank lending rates and 
ambiguously promise lines of credit to unnamed large institutions should 
they get into trouble. Executives and legislatures speak of tax cuts, 
government expenditures, and other stimulants. We know the drill. Sounds 
like 2007. 
At about this point in the process, the disturbing suggestion that the 
speculative buildup that has culminated in the plateau might have been the 
product of a Ponzi process begins to grow more and more widespread. 
Those who once were called ―Cassandras‖ come to look more like they 
might have been ―prophets.‖130 Some say, in triumph, ―I told you so.‖ 
Others say, ―what next?‖  
The same perception that the party may be nearing its end, meanwhile, 
often finds itself reinforced by the many scandals that typically emerge 
during these critical inflection periods.
131
 For as the boom phase nears its 
end prior to plateauing, it is common for some who have grown 
overextended to begin to cut corners, then more than corners. At first these 
folk talk themselves into believing that they will ―pay it all back.‖ But, in 
fact, many just dig themselves deeper and deeper, to the point that they 
 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. A Minsky coinage. See MINSKY, supra note 111, at 118.  
 129. Id.; see also KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 25–30. 
 130. This has been, for example, Professor Shiller‘s recent lot. See, e.g., SHILLER, IRRATIONAL 
EXUBERANCE, supra note 9 (blurb on back cover).  
 131. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 25–30; MINSKY, supra note 89; see also 
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 165–202. A contemporary example would be the Madoff 
scandal. 
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cannot delude even themselves any longer. It is almost surprising how 
consistent this pattern has been over the centuries. Truly, it seems, plus ça 
change. 
The stories of scandal associated with past booms‘ inflecting to busts 
are, in fact, fully as common as, and often even more notorious than, the 
―new era‖ stories typically associated with the same mentioned above.132 
Indeed, the name ―Ponzi‖ itself comes to us thanks not only to a Boston 
stock swindle, but also to a Florida real estate scam brought to light 
shortly before the 1929 stock market crash.
133
 Yes, in both cases that 
Ponzi—Charles Ponzi.134  
Now as a matter of mechanism, what is crucial at these plateaus is that 
all players gradually grow mindful of one consequence of the Ponzi 
process‘s having drawn to its limiting point: Each knows, first, that if 
people do begin massively selling their holdings of the asset in question, 
she herself will do best to leave first. For as has commonly been said of 
these circumstances in prior iterations in multiple jurisdictions, Sauve qui 
peut, den Letzen beißen die Hunde, or ―Devil take the hindmost.‖ And yet 
each knows also, second, both that should a mass exit begin, one will be 
lucky indeed to land front of the queue; and so long as no one does begin 
selling, most will be better off.  
And so now, of course, the ―game‖ we are playing is not ―Chicken‖ as 
before, but something more like traditional ―Prisoner‘s Dilemma.‖ As 
before, our problem is not one of rationality or efficiency, but of collective 
action. But now we are looking at downsides, not up; we are at the cliff‘s 
edge. And as it happens, just as in most empirical runs of the Prisoner 
game,
135
 most players do ultimately ―defect.‖ It is only a matter of time. 
―Stampeding‖ and ―panic selling‖ begin.  
The picture once panic selling begins is familiar: It is just that of the 
―bank run‖ familiar to all Americans prior to the development of deposit 
insurance in the early 1930s. Probably the most memorable image is that 
in Frank Capra‘s film, It‘s a Wonderful Life.136 It is also that, alas, of what 
we have been watching in real estate markets since late 2006, as well as in 
 
 
 132. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 165–202 for a catalogue of examples. See 
also GALBRAITH, supra note 1; ALLEN, supra note 1.  
 133. See, e.g., GALBRAITH, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
 134. The tale is well told in FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL 
HISTORY OF THE NINETEEN-TWENTIES (1931), a forgotten work that bears rediscovery today.   
 135. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 665–70 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. 
Roth eds., 1995).  
 136. IT‘S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=MJJN9qwhkkE.  
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real estate-linked markets since 2007. Those are markets that used to be 
dominated, so far as credit is concerned, by well-regulated, deposit-insured 
thrifts and commercial banks. But they are markets that, since the mid-
1990s, have featured a huge, scarcely regulated industry of so-called 
―mortgage banks.‖ To this unglamorous story we now turn.  
B. Bubbles Just Happened: Of Easy Credit, New Mortgage Products, 
House-Flipping, Foreclosure, and Global Contagion  
The model of asset price bubbles just schematized can be seen at work 
in most past financial crises.
137
 And odds are, it is only a matter of time 
before the U.S. experience of the past decade officially joins the parade of 
specimens in works of financial history. In this Subpart, I will explain 
why. I will first briefly recapitulate the past decade‘s most salient events, 
as selected by the model just sketched, and then proceed to solutions in 
Part III. As ever, the past decade‘s story appears to have begun with 
genuinely new, value-adding opportunities, which cheap credit and loose 
money then converted to untethered, Ponzi-style excess.  
1. The ―Greenspan Put‖: New Techs, New Stocks, New Eras, New 
Money 
Above, we noted that asset price bubbles typically begin with 
exogenous developments that attract new investment.
138
 In our recent 
financial history, the catalytic moments in question appear to have been 
first the development of home computing in the 1980s, then the 
privatization of two military communications infrastructures—the World 
Wide Web and Internet—in the mid-1990s. The latter medium ―took off‖ 
in 1995 with the switch to private control, thanks in part to the spread of 
inexpensive computing technology in the decade before.
139
  
The upshot was that when Netscape, which developed the first 
popularly accessible web browser, went public in mid-1995, its stock price 
more than doubled the first day.
140
 The year 1995 accordingly makes for a 
plausible point at which to date the onset both of the 1990s ―dot com‖ 
 
 
 137. See, e.g., KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1 (the best survey available).  
 138. See supra Part II. 
 139. See, e.g., Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P. Kesan, The Privatization of the Internet‘s Backbone 
Network, http://www.governingwithcode.org/journal_articles/pdf/Backbone.pdf (last visted May 18, 
2010). 
 140. See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 32; WILLIAM A. FLECKENSTEIN WITH FREDRICK SHEEHAN, 
GREENSPAN‘S BUBBLES: THE AGE OF IGNORANCE AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE 58 (2008).  
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bubble, and of the broader stock market boom that accompanied it. These 
bubbles, in turn, we shall see to have fed directly into our recent real estate 
boom—in effect, simply reversing the order in which stock and real estate 
bubbles inflated and burst in the late 1920s.  
Commencing with Netscape‘s IPO, investment in tech stocks rose 
steadily, then rapidly, throughout the second half of the 1990s, as did 
investment in stocks more generally.
141
 Initially, and in keeping with our 
model, these rises would have seemed warranted even by ―fundamental‖ 
value. As more and more firms learned how to employ new computing and 
communications technologies, they became more efficient. Productivity 
grew at historically high annual rates over the second half of the 1990s, at 
over 4%.
142
 It was only natural in such circumstances that firms would 
attract increased investment capital, and that the firms that seemed most 
responsible for the ―miracle‖—tech firms—would attract capital 
disproportionately. 
At the same time, there were other reasons to expect stock prices to rise 
rapidly. Some of these were arguably still ―fundamental‖ in character, 
others less so. For one thing, American firms over the course of the late 
1980s and early 1990s increasingly had adopted Japanese management 
and production techniques, which independently improved productivity 
growth.
143
 That was arguably nearly as ―fundamental‖ a change as the 
move to new computing and communications technologies. Somewhat less 
fundamental—or, at any rate, less permanent—however, was a critical 
demographic development: Baby boomers began entering their forties and 
fifties, typically the most productive working years in one‘s life, during 
this period.  
The age shift affected more than productivity, however; it also affected 
investment preferences and patterns.
144
 As they aged, baby boomers 
thought increasingly about retirement savings and sought sensible 
investment vehicles for those savings. It is no accident that the mutual 
fund boom, along with changes to the tax code meant to encourage 
retirement investment, commenced during this same period.
145
 Against this 
backdrop, it was natural not only that more people would be looking for 
securities in which to invest, but also that some people would begin 
 
 
 141. See FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, supra note 140. 
 142. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 32. 
 143. See, e.g., JEFFRY LIKER, REMADE IN AMERICA: TRANSPLANTING AND TRANSFORMING 
JAPANESE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (1999). 
 144. See infra note 145. 
 145. See MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER‘S VIEW (2008), on this 
boom.  
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betting on the prospect of asset price rises fueled by these demographic 
developments themselves. That is to say, it was natural that ―Beautiful 
Baby‖ trading of the kind described in our model—trading on expectations 
of other people‘s trading—would ensue. 
Not surprisingly, then, securities prices did rapidly accelerate upwards 
over the course of the second half of the 1990s.
146
 The Dow Jones, S&P 
500, and NASDAQ Composite Indices all rose steadily through 1995, 
more rapidly through most of 1996 and 1997, and then precipitously in the 
last years of the 1990s. Here are the trend lines: 
 
 
 146. See infra note 148. 
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FIGURE 1: DOW JONES, S & P 500, NASDAQ COMPOSITE TREND 
LINES, 1901–2009 
Dow Jones Industrial Average: Annual Returns  
Year Percent Year Percent Year Percent Year Percent 
1901 -8.7 1936 24.8 1971 6.1 2006 16.3 
1902 -0.4 1937 -32.8 1972 14.6 2007 6.4 
1903 -23.6 1938 28.0 1973 -16.6 2008 -33.8 
1904 41.7 1939 -3.0 1974 -27.6 2009 18.8 
1905 38.2 1940 -12.7 1975 38.3   
1906 -1.9 1941 -15.3 1976 17.9   
1907 -37.7 1942 7.6 1977 -17.3   
1908 46.6 1943 13.8 1978 -3.1   
1909 15.0 1944 12.1 1979 4.2   
1910 -17.9 1945 26.7 1980 14.9   
1911 0.4 1946 -8.1 1981 -9.2   
1912 7.6 1947 2.2 1982 19.6   
1913 -10.3 1948 -2.1 1983 20.3   
1914 -30.7 1949 13.1 1984 -3.7   
1915 81.7 1950 17.4 1985 27.7   
1916 -4.2 1951 14.4 1986 22.6   
1917 -21.7 1952 8.4 1987 2.3   
1918 10.5 1953 -3.8 1988 11.8   
1919 30.5 1954 44.0 1989 27.0   
1920 -32.9 1955 20.8 1990 -4.3   
1921 12.7 1956 2.3 1991 20.3   
1922 21.7 1957 -12.8 1992 4.2   
1923 -3.3 1958 34.0 1993 13.7   
1924 26.2 1959 16.4 1994 2.1   
1925 30.0 1960 -9.3 1995 33.5   
1926 0.3 1961 18.7 1996 26.0   
1927 28.8 1962 -10.8 1997 22.6   
1928 48.2 1963 17.0 1998 16.1   
1929 -17.2 1964 14.6 1999 25.2   
1930 -33.8 1965 10.9 2000 -6.2   
1931 -52.7 1966 -18.9 2001 -7.1   
1932 -23.1 1967 15.2 2002 -16.8   
1933 66.8 1968 4.3 2003 25.3   
1934 4.1 1969 -15.2 2004 3.1   
1935 38.6 1970 4.8 2005 -0.6   
The annual gain or loss in the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1901 to present. 
Dividends are not included. 
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S&P 500 Index: Annual Returns 1951–2009  
Year Percent Year Percent Year Percent Year Percent 
1951 16.3 1970 0.1 1989 27.3 2008 -38.5 
1952 11.8 1971 10.8 1990 -6.6 2009 23.5 
1953 -6.6 1972 15.6 1991 26.3   
1954 45.0 1973 -17.4 1992 4.5   
1955 26.4 1974 -29.7 1993 7.1   
1956 2.6 1975 31.5 1994 -1.5   
1957 -14.3 1976 19.1 1995 34.1   
1958 38.1 1977 -11.5 1996 20.3   
1959 8.5 1978 1.1 1997 31.0   
1960 -3.0 1979 12.3 1998 26.7   
1961 23.1 1980 25.8 1999 19.5   
1962 -11.8 1981 -9.7 2000 -10.1   
1963 18.9 1982 14.8 2001 -13.0   
1964 13.0 1983 17.3 2002 -23.4   
1965 9.1 1984 1.4 2003 26.4   
1966 -13.1 1985 26.3 2004 9.0   
1967 20.1 1986 14.6 2005 3.0   
1968 7.7 1987 2.0 2006 13.6   
1969 -11.4 1988 12.4 2007 3.5   
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These lines ought to give pause when considered against the backdrop 
of the model of asset price bubbles and bursts sketched in Part II.A. By the 
lights of that model, it is natural to anticipate growth in borrowing rates, as 
stock price rises draw the attention of ―Beautiful Baby,‖ then Ponzi-style 
investors. And so, indeed, things appear to have transpired, as measured 
by leverage ratios among individuals and financial institutions: 
 
FIGURE 2: LEVERAGE RATE TREND LINES, 1995–2000 
 
Now, in light of these trend lines, one might have expected the Fed—at 
any rate, William McChesney Martin‘s ―lean against the wind‖ Fed—to 
step in with a view to modulating market behavior. At least that would be 
so were the Fed to view itself as a collective actor, charged with 
addressing the collective action problem that we saw asset price bubbles 
effectively to be in Part II.A. It could have played that role by imposing 
higher capital requirements upon, or by raising the federal fund rate 
charged to, depository institutions. It could also have done so by 
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tightening the money supply. One might also have expected that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) before 1999, and perhaps the 
Fed after 1999, would tighten up leverage limits on investment banks. In 
fact, however, this was a period that saw both continued financial 
deregulation and a pronounced tendency by the Fed to keep interest rates 
low and the money supply growing: the story of the much-storied 
―Greenspan Put.‖147 
In August 1995, the month of the Netscape IPO mentioned a moment 
ago, the Fed Open Market Committee (FOMC) dropped the benchmark 
federal funds rate from 6.00% to 5.75%.
148
 The rate continued to drop 
thereafter, notwithstanding continued price rises on the securities markets, 
for the next year and a half.
149
 The March 1997 FOMC meeting brought a 
modest rise in the rate to 5.5%, but this was quickly followed by three 
successive cuts over the following fifteen months.
150
  
By the end of 1997, meanwhile, the S&P 500 was up 31% for the year, 
and over 100% relative to where it had been when the rate-cutting began 
in mid-1995.
151
 By mid-1998, the same index had gained another 21%, by 
which point the Fed had eased up the rate again to 5.5%.
152
 With the 
collapse of the Russian ruble and the near-failing of the Long Term 
Capital Management Hedge Fund in the early autumn of that year, 
however, the Fed acted preemptively to maintain market confidence by 
cutting the rate once again to 5.25%.
153
 Though the markets had quickly 
rebounded by October, the FOMC surprised everyone with an 
extraordinary follow-up cut to 5%.
154
 
Thus was born the popular notion of the ―Greenspan Put.‖155 This was 
the name given to the growing determination by market investors, over the 
course of the late 1990s, that the Fed would do nearly anything to prevent 
a serious market decline.
156
 This meant in effect that those investors could 
take on as much risk as they pleased in betting on continued market price 
rises. This determination proved for a long while to be correct, with 
predictable consequences: Although by mid-October the markets were up 
 
 
 147. See, e.g., Greenspan Put, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/greenspan 
put.asp (last visited May 18, 2010). 
 148. See, e.g., FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, supra note 140, at 33.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 45.  
 151. Id. at 46. 
 152. Id. at 50.  
 153. Id. at 51. 
 154. Id. at 55. 
 155. See supra note 147. 
 156. Id. 
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by over 3% for the year, and two months later were up 5% more, the 
FOMC nonetheless cut rates again, to 4.75%, in November 1998.
157
  
Now began the switch, in effect, to ―afterburners,‖ as described per the 
model of Part II.A. Tech stocks, in particular, began to rise precipitously, 
largely on borrowed money, at the end of the 1990s.
158
 A few well-known 
examples: Theglobe.com‘s IPO, in mid-November, saw the price of its 
stock rise by over 600% in one day.
159
 The day after Thanksgiving that 
year, all fifteen of the NASDAQ‘s top-gaining stocks rose more than 
45%.
160
  
The new year saw the trend accelerating. The average share price gains 
for tech firms going public in the first quarter of 1999 were as follows: In 
January, 271%; in February, 145%; in March, 146%.
161
 By mid-year, the 
NASDAQ had more than doubled relative to the previous mid-October 
measure, when the FOMC had begun its run of rate-cutting.
162
 Finally, the 
Fed began raising rates incrementally upward again, to 5.25% in August, 
then 5.5% in November 1999.
163
  
By this point, however, incremental Fed funds rate rises were 
apparently being ignored.
164
 This is not very surprising. For one thing, 
investors had by now come to anticipate that the Fed would simply lower 
rates again at the first sign of market dipping.
165
 That was the ―put.‖ For 
another thing, by this point, stock prices were rising so rapidly that a small 
hike in interest rates would have appeared negligible; tech IPO stocks 
were routinely rising by hundreds of percentage points on their very first 
days.
166
 Against that sort of rise, what‘s another quarter percent interest 
rate rise? After all, breaking the back of the 1970s consumer price 
inflation had required Paul Volcker‘s Fed to raise rates to 18%.167  
At the same time, moreover, in anticipation of ―Y2K‖ worries, the Fed 
had been pumping newly printed money into the economy from September 
through November of 1999.
168
 The money supply grew by $147 billion 
 
 
 157. FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, supra note 140, at 59. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 54.  
 160. Id. at 60. 
 161. Id. at 63.  
 162. Id. at 68–70. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See, e.g., id. at 64–65.  
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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during the period—a 14% annualized growth rate.169 The last two months 
of the year saw that rate grow yet higher, to a 44% annualized rate.
170
 This, 
for its part, fed into a longer-running Fed trend of this period. From early 
1996 to late 1999, the money supply grew by $1.6 trillion, about 20% of 
GDP.
171
 This growth would have fueled the stock price bubble as readily 
as low borrowing rates. And it, too, began at about the same time as the 
Internet privatization mentioned above.  
Old benchmarks of ―fundamental‖ value in the case of stocks, 
meanwhile, did not appear to warrant the Fed‘s willingness to ignore stock 
price inflation while celebrating low consumer price inflation; price to 
earning ratios grew to unheard-of heights during this period.
172
 Sober 
éminences grises like Paul Volcker increasingly worried aloud that tech 
stock prices, growing as rapidly as they were, were associated with firms 
that had yet to show profits.
173
 Similar concerns were raised in this period 
by respected financial economists like John Geanakoplos and Robert 
Shiller.
174
 It took a while, but in time, they began to be heard.  
It gradually came to be clear by the early months of 2000 that the past 
several years had been witnessing a classic credit- and loose-money-fueled 
stock price bubble. The NASDAQ had risen over 900% relative to where 
it had been five years earlier.
175
 Nevertheless, by early February, the 
FOMC still had not raised rates beyond 5.75%—where they had been at 
the time of the Netscape IPO referenced above.
176
 That same week, the 
NASDAQ rose 9%—its largest weekly gain in twenty-five years.177 It 
continued to rise until March 10th, the day of its peak. That day, at 5048, it 
had risen 24% of its level on the first day of the year. But over the 
following two months, it lost 47% of its value.
178
 The ―Minsky Moment‖ 
had been reached in the tech stock markets.  
Stocks more generally, not just tech stocks, began suffering, too. In the 
first days of 2001, the S&P 500 dropped 10%.
179
 The FOMC responded by 
 
 
 169. Id. at 74. 
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com/toros_running_of_the_bull/2006/12/disagreeing_wit.html. 
 174. See, e.g., SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 9; Mark Whitehouse, Crisis 
Compels Economists to Reach for New Paradigm, WALL ST. J., at A18, available at http://online.wsj. 
com/article/SB125720159912223873.html. 
 175. FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, supra note 140, at 84. 
 176. Id. at 85.  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at 100.  
 179. Id. at 111. 
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cutting the lending rate again, to 6%, after a sequence of incremental hikes 
that had been imposed in the final months of the bubble that peaked in 
2000.
180
 The stock markets wavered thereafter for the first half of the 
year.
181
 It seemed that their bubble potential had been spent. That raised a 
question: What else remained to maintain growth in the broader economy? 
The answer was real estate.  
2. Flip That House: When Houses No Longer Are Homes 
As the equity bubble inflated over the course of the late 1990s, 
spillover from the ―wealth effects‖ experienced by equity holders 
gradually grew discernible in the real estate markets. During the first half 
of the decade, growth in mortgage debt outstanding grew at an average 
annual rate of 3.7%.
182
 That rate grew to 6.2%, however, in 1996 and 
1997, then to 9.5% by 1998.
183
 By late 2000, total mortgage debt in the 
United States was 50% higher than it had been five years before.
184
 
Wall Street took notice of these developments just as it did that of 
growing interest in tech and other stocks. As long-term interest rates 
descended and the money supply grew during the latter half of the 1990s, 
all while stock prices shot upward and home prices edged in the same 
direction, financial firms began developing and marketing new debt 
products.
185
 In a sense, this was again quite predictable because the prices 
of homes—since the 1930s, by far the most highly levered purchases most 
Americans make—are highly responsive to borrowing costs.186  
An early new debt product developed in these years was the ―refi,‖ a 
means of converting home equity growth into cash.
187
 With lower interest 
rates, homeowners could borrow higher loan amounts on the same 
monthly payment arrangements, pay off their previous home loans, and 
pocket the difference. Refinancing transactions, valued at $14 billion in 
1995, leapt to nearly a quarter-trillion over the ensuing decade.
188
 As 
demand for refis grew, so did demand for more rapid means of processing 
 
 
 180. Id. at 114. 
 181. Id. at 120. 
 182. Id. at 129. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See supra note 7 on this point. 
 187. See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 68. 
 188. Id. 
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loan applications.
189
 Credit scoring came increasingly to be automated, and 
decreasingly to be subject to careful verification.
190
  
The tasks of credit scoring, and then credit origination, came 
increasingly to be farmed out as well. A new industry of federally 
unregulated ―mortgage banks,‖ mortgage brokers, and other mortgage 
originators began growing rapidly in the second half of the 1990s.
191
 We 
know some of the names now: Countrywide, Indy Mac, etc. But in the 
early days, these firms grew in the shadows—in the vacuum, really—left 
by the hosts of failed thrift institutions that went under during the S&L 
crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, itself the product of deregulation. 
It is only now that we are coming to appreciate the full significance of this 
shift; the shift from mortgage-finance originally handled primarily by 
well-regulated, community-oriented depository institutions that retained 
the mortgages they originated, to a new industry of unregulated, 
―countrywide‖ institutions out to sell what they originated to secondary 
holders.  
With increasing numbers of unregulated mortgage originators came an 
increasing number of yet newer financial products, developed with the aim 
of bringing yet more people into the levered home-buying markets.
192
 
Adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), which offered low front-end ―teaser‖ 
rates that later ―ballooned,‖ were developed to attract less-wealthy buyers 
into the home markets.
193
 As home prices accelerated over the second half 
of the 1990s and then especially in the early 2000s, these debt structures 
came to look less imprudent than they might have looked in the past.
194
 It 
became increasingly plausible to believe that one might ―refi‖ one‘s 
mortgage before higher payment rates kicked in. Indeed, as noted earlier, 
Fed Chairman Greenspan himself was saying as much by the early 
2000s.
195
 
As home prices continued to rise through the late 1990s and early 
2000s, mortgage originators naturally looked for new prospects to whom 
to lend. If that were not motive enough, the investment banks and other 
financial intermediaries, who were discovering the virtues of MBSs—
essentially, rights to portions of payment streams generated by 
mortgages—gradually added to pressures to find new borrowers. The so-
 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id.  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See supra note 34.  
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called ―securitization‖ of mortgages did not, contrary to popular belief, 
begin during this period; that began in the late 1930s, as part of the tale 
told in the next Part.
196
 But in the late 1990s and early 2000s, MBSs 
became a favored investment vehicle.
197
 For one thing, the United States 
had not seen large numbers of mortgage defaults since the 1930s—largely 
thanks to the programs discussed below in Part III.
198
 For another thing, 
once home prices began to rise quickly, profits on lending grew, too; the 
safe form of investment that was the MBS became likewise a lucrative 
one. 
Now, in the case of the U.S. housing markets, the classic positive 
feedback loop described in the model presented in Part II.A appears to 
have kicked in by the early 2000s. Increasingly, people began borrowing 
to buy homes less with a view to inhabiting them than with a view to 
―flipping‖ them—to selling them at a profit as home prices rose. By 2005, 
fully 40% of all U.S. home purchases had come to be investment 
purchases—bought with the intention of resale.199 That fact showed up in a 
particularly telling pair of numbers: Whereas in 1990, there was a total of 
$3.8 trillion in outstanding mortgage debt in the United States, in the two 
years from 2003 to 2005, mortgage debt grew by nearly that amount.
200
  
The ―subprime‖ loans of which we have heard so much in recent years 
appear to have gained popularity as a response to the housing markets 
entering this ―positive feedback loop‖ phase.201 By about 2003, the market 
for credit to low-risk borrowers had begun to show signs of saturation. 
Subprime lending—essentially, loans to people with poor credit histories, 
unreliable incomes, or both—grew markedly from 2001 to 2005. Annual 
volume was $145 billion in 2001.
202
 It was over $625 billion in 2005, 
accounting for over 20% of home lending in the years 2004–2006.203 That 
compared to less than 3% in 1997.
204
 Over a third of the subprime loans 
extended in 2004–2006, moreover, were for 100% or more of home 
value—in effect, an infinite leverage rate.205 The worst of these loans came 
to be known as ―Ninjas,‖ short for ―no income, no job, no assets.‖206 
 
 
 196. See infra Part III. 
 197. See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 70. 
 198. Id.; see also infra Part III. 
 199. See FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, supra note 140, at 158.  
 200. Id.  
 201. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 70. 
 202. See id.; SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 9, at 57.  
 203. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 70. 
 204. Id.  
 205. Id. at 71.  
 206. Id.  
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Ordinarily, of course, lending on such terms would not have been 
thought prudent—nor would such borrowing. But again, when prices are 
growing at double-digit rates, borrowers and lenders, not unreasonably, 
assume that refinancing on the basis of growing collateral values will be 
available. So do others. Add in the fact that the two largest mortgage 
securitizers—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, more on which in Part III—
had historic missions to boost home-ownership among lower-income 
Americans, and it becomes much less surprising that so much risky 
lending and borrowing occurred in the early 2000s. 
Against this backdrop, Fed monetary and interest rate policy during the 
period looks all the more ominous. As noted in the previous section, the 
burst of the tech stock bubble in 2000 led to a difficult period for securities 
markets. By mid-2001, the NASDAQ was down 34% for the year, the 
S&P down 18%.
207
 The FOMC continually cut interest rates in response, 
to the point that the Fed funds rate was down to 3.5% by September of 
2001.
208
 It seems largely by now to have been forgotten that, immediately 
following the terrorist attacks of that month, talk was not of the possibility 
of a loss of confidence in the securities markets. The concern was, rather, 
the possibility of an extension of a ―corporate profits recession‖ already 
long since underway.
209
 
The concern proved to be well founded. The NASDAQ declined 
another 32% over 2002, while the S&P fell another 24%.
210
 The Fed 
responded to these developments both by lowering the Fed funds rate 
dramatically, and by commencing to tout growing real estate prices as a 
means of encouraging increased consumer spending.
211
 By the end of 
2001, for example, the funds rate was down to 1.75%.
212
 By late 2002, it 
was at 1.25%.
213
 Though economic growth had picked up by 2003 with the 
surge in Iraq war expenditures, the FOMC dropped the funds rate yet 
further, to 1%, in the second quarter of that year.
214
 There the rate 
remained for a full year, until mid-2004.
215
 All of this was occurring as 
home prices, which again are particularly sensitive to interest rates, 
 
 
 207. See FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, supra note 140, at 120.  
 208. Id.  
 209. Id. at 123. 
 210. Id. at 125.  
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 120.  
 213. See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 115.  
 214. Id.  
 215. Id.  
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charged upward. Here are the numbers in the principal metropolitan areas 
of the United States: 
 
FIGURE 3: FOR DATA ON THE PAST 20 YEARS IN 25 MAJOR METRO 
AREAS, SEE: HTTP://WWW.FHFA.GOV/WEBFILES/15426/ 
4Q09HPICBSAPO.TXT  
 
The credit-enabled housing bubble began to draw attention—most of it 
favorable—from the popular media and the Fed alike by 2002. 
Mainstream magazine articles advised Americans how to ―[b]orrow 
against [their] house[s] to buy stocks.‖216 Fed Chairman Greenspan 
testified before Congress on how growing real estate prices were 
compensating for the ongoing stock price decline.
217
 Increasingly, it 
seems, policymakers and citizens at large were relying on home price rises 
as a generator of consumer spending and economic growth.  
The problem, however, was that the growth was being fueled not by 
any underlying growth in ―fundamental‖ value, but by the positive 
feedback loop of our model. It was Ponzi growth, as is readily verified by 
comparing home prices with two plausible proxies for fundamental 
value—rental prices and home building prices. Figures 4 and 5 supply the 
comparisons. 
 
FIGURE 4: HOME PRICE TRENDS COMPARED TO RENTAL PRICE 
TRENDS, 2000–2005 
RATIOS OF HOME 
PRICES 
TO RENTAL PRICES IN 
SELECTED METRO AREAS 
HOME 
PRICE/ 
RENTAL 
PRICE 
1Q 2000 
HOME 
PRICE/ 
RENTAL 
PRICE 
1Q 2005 
AVG. 
ANNUAL 
GROWTH, 
2000-5  
Home Prices 
AVG. 
ANNUAL 
GROWTH, 
2000-5  
Rental Prices 
San Francisco 12.5 34.1 13.9% -1.5% 
San Jose, Calif. 14.1 34.0 7.9 -3.5 
West Palm Beach-Boca 
Raton, Fla. 
11.6 29.4 23.0 2.1 
San Diego 13.5 28.9 20.5 4.2 
Sacramento 11.5 26.5 22.4 3.9 
 
 
 216. See FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, supra note 140, at 139.  
 217. Id.  
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RATIOS OF HOME 
PRICES 
TO RENTAL PRICES IN 
SELECTED METRO AREAS 
HOME 
PRICE/ 
RENTAL 
PRICE 
1Q 2000 
HOME 
PRICE/ 
RENTAL 
PRICE 
1Q 2005 
AVG. 
ANNUAL 
GROWTH, 
2000-5  
Home Prices 
AVG. 
ANNUAL 
GROWTH, 
2000-5  
Rental Prices 
Orange County, Calif. 11.8 25.7 18.8 3.4 
New York City metro area 10.6 25.4 14.1 0.4 
Los Angeles-Long Beach 12.3 24.9 19.6 3.1 
Fort Lauderdale, Fla. 11.6 24.5 19.6 2.4 
Miami, Fla. 11.5 24.5 19.3 2.6 
Orlando, Fla. 11.9 24.3 13.4 1.6 
Boston 11.5 23.9 16.9 3.5 
Las Vegas 11.8 23.4 17.7 3.7 
Riverside-San Bernardino, 
Calif. 
11.9 23.1 21.2 7.7 
Nassau-Suffolk, N.Y. 10.8 21.9 19.0 4.8 
Oakland, Calif. 11.4 21.7 12.3 -1.5 
Phoenix-Mesa 12.2 19.7 9.1 -0.6 
Washington, D.C. 11.2 19.6 17.1 3.7 
Middlesex-Somerset-
Hunterdon, N.J.  
11.6 19.1 15.2 2.3 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett 12.8 19.0 8.2 -0.4 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-
Clearwater 
11.4 19.0 12.8 0.8 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn. 12.0 18.7 10.0 Unch. 
Newark, N.J. 10.9 18.4 13.3 1.4 
Atlanta 12.7 17.8 5.4 -1.3 
Baltimore 11.5 17.7 14.1 3.7 
Chicago 11.4 17.4 9.0 -0.9 
Hartford, Conn. 11.2 17.2 11.0 2.2 
United States 11.6 17.1 7.7 2.1 
Denver 11.6 16.5 6.9 -0.5 
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RATIOS OF HOME 
PRICES 
TO RENTAL PRICES IN 
SELECTED METRO AREAS 
HOME 
PRICE/ 
RENTAL 
PRICE 
1Q 2000 
HOME 
PRICE/ 
RENTAL 
PRICE 
1Q 2005 
AVG. 
ANNUAL 
GROWTH, 
2000-5  
Home Prices 
AVG. 
ANNUAL 
GROWTH, 
2000-5  
Rental Prices 
Milwaukee-Waukesha 10.8 16.3 8.3 -0.5 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill 11.0 16.3 4.2 -1.1 
Houston 11.6 16.2 6.0 1.4 
Jacksonville 11.8 16.1 12.0 6.1 
San Antonio 11.5 16.1 7.2 1.1 
Portland-Vancouver 11.8 15.9 6.6 Unch. 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill 12.3 15.2 1.8 -1.8 
Dallas 11.9 15.0 4.8 Unch. 
Memphis 11.8 14.8 3.4 0.1 
Austin-San Marcos 11.9 14.5 -0.7 -0.7 
Kansas City 11.4 14.5 4.5 -0.8 
Cincinnati 10.9 14.4 3.4 -0.5 
El Paso 10.6 14.3 6.5 0.6 
St. Louis 11.8 14.0 3.4 -0.5 
Philadelphia 11.2 14.0 7.3 0.9 
Greensboro-Winston-Salem-
High Point 
10.8 13.7 2.3 -1.3 
Tulsa, Okla. 10.9 13.6 4.4 -0.8 
Oklahoma City 10.8 13.5 5.2 Unch. 
Pittsburgh 10.5 13.5 5.0 -0.8 
New Orleans 11.0 13.3 6.3 1.5 
Columbus, Ohio 11.4 13.2 2.7 -0.3 
Birmingham, Ala. 11.2 13.1 4.2 1.5 
Salt Lake City-Ogden 10.9 12.9 3.3 -0.3 
Indianapolis 11.6 12.8 2.3 Unch. 
Greenville-Spartanburg- 11.4 12.8 2.5 -0.3 
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RATIOS OF HOME 
PRICES 
TO RENTAL PRICES IN 
SELECTED METRO AREAS 
HOME 
PRICE/ 
RENTAL 
PRICE 
1Q 2000 
HOME 
PRICE/ 
RENTAL 
PRICE 
1Q 2005 
AVG. 
ANNUAL 
GROWTH, 
2000-5  
Home Prices 
AVG. 
ANNUAL 
GROWTH, 
2000-5  
Rental Prices 
Anderson 
Albuquerque 11.4 11.8 3.4 1.0 
Source: Economy.com. From NYT May 2005: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/27/business/28home. 
moredata.html 
 
 
FIGURE 5: HOME PRICE TRENDS COMPARED TO BUILDING COST 
TRENDS, 1890–2005 
 
In Part IV, I shall argue that information of this sort should be used by 
our chief financial regulator, the Fed, in order to catch bubbles as they 
begin to inflate. But we‘re not there yet.  
As levered home purchasing drove housing prices higher and higher, 
those who were doing the driving by borrowing grew increasingly 
exposed—again, as in our model. Were home prices to cease growing, 
refinancing would cease to be available, ―balloon‖ rates would accordingly 
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kick in, and people would find themselves ―under water.‖ Were that to 
happen, of course, lenders would be exposed, too. So would those who 
owed obligations to the lenders. And this, too, it turns out, was an 
important financial development over the course of the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. 
Financial institutions that invested in MBSs increasingly entered into 
derivative risk-trading arrangements with a view to insuring themselves 
against losses in portfolio value, in the event of mortgage default.
218
 The 
huge growth in markets for credit-default swaps of which so much was 
heard in 2008, along with those for a host of other derivative risk-sharing 
instruments, were products of this era.
219
 
Ordinarily, of course, the spread of risk-bearing is a good thing. It 
lessens the exposures of individual actors and makes credit more widely 
available and, of course, less expensive.
220
 But when the risks being spread 
all amount to the risk that a bubble will burst, the spreading in question is 
that of a swathe of destruction; it is a growth in the number of victims 
once the bubble inevitably bursts. But, of course, the same bubble that 
facilitates that spread of exposure is what masks appreciation of how risky 
the risks in fact are. For bubble psychology, per the model sketched above, 
quickly feeds into ―new era‖ talk, as well as beliefs that the asset price in 
question ―can only go up.‖  
In the case of real estate, of course, such beliefs seem all the more 
reasonable in view of the finite nature of the asset. Land is in limited 
supply, while populations keep growing. And home prices have indeed 
tended to trend upward, albeit at more reasonable rates than those of the 
early 2000s, over time. Perhaps this is why reputable bond rating agencies 
gave Triple-A ratings to MBSs, even those backed by large numbers of 
subprime mortgages. Their valuation models, after all, assumed unceasing 
6–8% growth rates in underlying home prices.221  
With ratings like those given MBSs by the rating agencies, it is 
scarcely surprising that AIG and other insurers were willing to take on the 
portfolio risks of so many financial institutions that purchased real and 
synthetic mortgage-backed securities in the early 2000s. At all events, the 
spread of risk-bearing over the course of the housing price bubble assured 
that, once it burst, many would be swept into the ensuring contraction. 
 
 
 218. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 73–79. 
 219. See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 15, at 73–79.  
 220. A commonplace in explaining the advantages of securitization. See infra Part III on the role 
of Fannie Mae. 
 221. See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 78.  
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And, of course, burst it would do. For even undeniable long-term upward 
trends, especially if punctuated by periods of bubble behavior, can feature 
counterpart periods of decline.  
3. Foreclosure and Global Contagion: That Huge Sucking Sound 
Housing prices seem to have reached their own ―Minsky Moment‖ late 
in the first half of 2006.
222
 By this point, as many as could be drawn in to 
the levered home-purchase markets had apparently been drawn in. Prices 
could not continue to rise in the manner that they had done over the 
previous five to ten years, and they leveled off.
223
 Then they began to 
decline.
224
 Naturally, in such circumstances, those who had borrowed 
pursuant to terms only sustainable so long as prices continued to rise 
found themselves pinched. As balloon mortgage rates began to balloon, 
low-end borrowers began to default on their mortgages.
225
 That, of course, 
quickly began lowering the values of mortgage-backed securities.
226
 And 
that, in turn, quickly led to calls upon credit default swappers and other de 
facto insurers to make counterparties whole. 
Over $350 billion worth of subprime and other low-grade home loans 
that were closed in 2005 and 2006 ―reset‖ in 2007 and 2008, and their 
monthly payments began to balloon.
227
 Foreclosure rates rapidly mounted 
in consequence.
228
 Talk of a ―subprime crisis‖ accordingly began to be 
heard in the spring, then increasingly through summer and autumn, of 
2007.
229
 Lenders, then holders of repayment rights, began to feel the pinch. 
All of the highest-profile financial institution defaults and bailouts—
commencing with Countrywide itself in 2007, on down through Bear 
Stearns, Fannie and Freddie, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Washington Mutual, 
and others—stem directly from the collapse of home prices and 
consequent mortgage defaults.  
 
 
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id.  
 228. Id. 
 229. See, e.g., Will the Subprime Crisis Ripple through Economy?, MSNBC.COM, Mar. 13, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17584725; Ben. S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago‘s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: The 
Subprime Mortgage Market (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/bernanke20070517a.htm. 
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Add to all of this the facts that (1) other nations, too—such as the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and Spain—went through real estate bubbles 
of their own during these years;
230
 and (2) MBSs and derivative 
arrangements tied to mortgage values are held by and implicate the 
financial positions of institutions all across the globe,
231
 and it is readily 
appreciated why the current crisis has from the start been global in nature. 
And that is before factoring in the role that contracting credit and 
plummeting consumer confidence plays in lowering global demand for 
goods and services. Scarce wonder that the IMF reported in early 2009 
that the entire world economy was set for its first contraction since the 
1940s, which is quite ominous in light of what happened, globally 
speaking, last time around.
232
  
The following two figures summarize what has happened and where 
we are now. The first reprises the web of financial relations described over 
the previous pages. The second summarizes likely debt defaults and write-
downs, by category, apt to occur in the coming few years. 
 
 
 230. See MORRIS, supra note 15, at 78. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See Int‘l Monetary Fund, World Growth Grinds to Virtual Halt, IMF Urges Decisive Global 
Policy Response, Jan. 28, 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/res 
012809a.htm. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss6/1
  
 
 
 
 
2010] A FIXER-UPPER FOR FINANCE 1265 
 
 
 
 
 
―Mortgage 
Banks‖ 
 
 
Home Loan 
Borrowers 
$ 
Mortgage Debt 
 
Share- 
Holders 
$ Equity 
No Depositors, 
No Federal 
Regulation 
No $ Deposits 
No Obligations 
 
 
Securitizers 
$ 
Mortgage Debt 
 
Share- 
Holders 
$ 
Equity 
 
FI 
 
FI 
 
FI 
$ 
MBS 
$ 
MBS 
MBS 
CDS 
CDS 
$ 
Share-Holders 
or Depositors 
Share-Holders 
or Depositors 
Share-Holders 
or Depositors 
$ 
Equity or 
Debt 
$ 
Equity or 
Debt 
$ 
Equity or 
Debt 
FIGURE 6: FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENT CRISIS 
 
―FI‖ means Financial Institution—i.e., a Commercial Bank, Investment 
Bank, Investment Company, Pension Fund, Insurance Company, or like 
institution. ―MBS‖ means mortgage-backed security. ―CDS‖ means credit 
default swap or other derivative arrangement. The shaded circle and boxes 
indicate that mortgage ―banks‖ are not banks in the ordinary sense—they 
take no deposits and are not regulated as depository institutions. The best 
known of them these days is probably Countrywide Financial, taken over 
by Bank of America in June 2008 after financially faltering. The best 
known ―securitizers‖ are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Another notorious 
securitizer, this one lacking any ―implicit federal guarantee,‖ was the so-
called ―IndyMac,‖ recently put in receivership. 
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FIGURE 7: TABLE OF ESTIMATED DEFAULTS AND WRITE-DOWNS, 
CATEGORIZED BY FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT-TYPE
233
 
INSTRUMENT CURRENT 
OUTSTANDING 
DEFAULT 
PERCENTAGE 
WRITE-DOWN 
PERCENTAGE 
RECOVERY  
RATE 
NET 
LOSS 
TOTAL 
SUBPRIME & OTHER 
HIGH- RISK 
MORTGAGE 
DEFAULTS  
 
$1,500 
 
30% 
 
NA 
 
50% 
 
$225 
 
SUBPRIME-BASED 
CDO WRITE-DOWNS 
 
$1,200 
 
NA 
 
40% 
 
NA 
 
$480 
 
PRIME MORTGAGE & 
PRIME MBS WRITE-
DOWNS 
 
$5,000 
 
5% 
 
NA 
 
50% 
 
$125 
 
COLLATERALIZED 
MBS DEFAULTS 
 
$950 
 
10% 
 
NA 
 
50% 
 
$48 
 
COLLATERALIZED 
MBS WRITE-DOWNS 
 
$855 
 
NA 
 
15% 
 
NA 
 
$128 
 
NON-MBS REAL 
ESTATE WRITE-
DOWNS 
 
$2,400 
 
10% 
 
NA 
 
50% 
 
$120 
 
$1,126 
 
C. What Next? 
What, then, are we to do? Well, as mentioned at the outset of this 
Article, we have been here before—not just contraction-wise, but 
combined stock-and-real-estate-contraction-wise. What is more, we have 
reached our present state precisely by having thrown off and bypassed the 
methods that we put in place to address the problem last time around—in 
the 1930s. The next Part accordingly shows how to address our present 
difficulties, precisely by recovering and restoring those systems of 
mortgage-finance and financial regulation that worked so well from the 
1930s until the 1990s.  
 
 
 233. Source: Morris, supra note 15, at 136–37. Note: This Table excludes anticipated defaults and 
write-downs on other forms of debt, including non-mortgage-related corporate bonds and 
collateralized loan obligations, as well as credit card and automobile-loan debt. When added to the 
above, Morris anticipates over $ 2 trillion in defaults and write-downs economy-wide. 
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III. THE FOUNDATIONS AS FIRST LAID: WHERE WE WERE AND  
HOW WE GOT THERE 
Public memory of the era immediately preceding the New Deal 
features two gaps that we would do well now to fill. The first is that, as 
mentioned above, the 1929 stock market crash was in fact but a stage in a 
longer-term decline.
234
 It was immediately preceded over that course by a 
crash in the real estate market. The second is that the system of home 
mortgage finance that has made America ―a nation of home-owners,‖ as 
well as that introduced the financial innovation known as ―securitization‖ 
itself, was actually designed and then instituted over the course of the 
1930s and ‗40s, precisely in response to the just-mentioned crisis.235  
Prior to the 1930s, fewer than 40% of American families owned their 
own homes, while since that time, upwards of 70% have come to enjoy 
that status.
236
 Where homes are concerned, in other words, the ―ownership 
society‖ is a New Deal invention. That society, however, along with the 
mentioned statistic, is now under threat—as are, in consequence, our and 
the world‘s financial systems—just as they were in the early 1930s.237  
Early in the twentieth century, as now, most who purchased residential 
real estate did so at least partly on credit.
238
 What was different was that 
fewer, for that reason, purchased housing at all. Housing credit markets 
were more fragmented, mortgages in consequence much less liquid 
investments than they have since become.
239
 Home loans in consequence 
were extended for much briefer terms—generally two to three years—at 
the end of which they would ―balloon‖ to come due in full.240  
Loan-to-value ratios before the 1930s, in turn, were very low by 
modern standards. As little as fifty percent was considered high and was 
 
 
 234. See supra note 1. 
 235. See, e.g., J. Paul Mitchell, Historical Overview of Federal Policy: Encouraging 
Homeownership, in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS: PAST AND PRESENT 39, 41 (J. Paul 
Mitchell ed., 1985); see also D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF FEDERAL MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS 2–
25 (1989); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 203–18 (1985). See generally Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra 
note 4. 
 236. See Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 4, at 86–120; see 
also Mitchell, supra note 235, Burke, supra note 235, and Jackson, supra note 235. 
 237. See Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 4, at 86–120; see 
also Mitchell, supra note 235, Burke, supra note 235, and Jackson, supra note 235. 
 238. See Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 4, at 86–120; see 
also Mitchell, supra note 235, Burke, supra note 235, and Jackson, supra note 235. 
 239. See Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 4, at 86–120; see 
also Mitchell, supra note 235, Burke, supra note 235, and Jackson, supra note 235. 
 240. See Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 4, at 86–120.  
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rare.
241
 Financing on such terms not surprisingly fell short of most would-
be buyers‘ capacities. And so second mortgages, junior liens, and rollover 
refinancings were the norm.
242
 This was not terribly problematic for those 
who dared buy, so long as real estate values continued to rise, as they 
did—very rapidly—through most of the 1920s.243 Refinancing, then, as 
more recently, was not difficult when the value of one‘s collateral—the 
home itself—continued to rise in the real estate boom of the 1920s.244  
When real estate prices leveled off and then began falling in 1928, 
however, short-term mortgages no longer could be refinanced in full.
245
 
Again, things were much as they are today. Resultant forced sales and 
foreclosures, which reached the rate of over 1000 per day once some 50% 
of all home mortgages in the country had gone into default, brought prices 
steadily lower.
246
 The real estate market fell into the familiar ―downward 
spiral.‖ The parallel with today could not be more striking.  
Indeed, the parallels proliferate. For then also, as today, the crisis that 
afflicted the real estate market spread much more widely, ultimately 
reaching the stock market itself. The reasons were obvious: For one thing, 
upwards of 30% of the American labor force was employed either in the 
home-building industry itself, or in industries that were bound to lose 
business as home-builders went out of business.
247
 For another thing, of 
course, disemployed labor, like fearful and foreclosed mortgagees 
themselves, spent less money, feeding yet further contraction.
248
 The 
vortex of contraction, recession, and then depression was on. 
The programs instituted to address this widening real estate-rooted 
crisis, begun in the last year of the Hoover administration, broadened 
through the Roosevelt years and continuing in but minimally altered form 
today, cannot fail to impress in their innovativeness and 
comprehensiveness. The process began with the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Act (FHLBA) of 1932,
249
 which authorized establishment of a system of 
Regional Federal Home Loan Banks roughly parallel to that of the Federal 
Reserve‘s system of Regional Federal Reserve Banks. The Regional 
 
 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id.  
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 4; Milton P. Semer et 
al., Evolution of Federal Legislative Policy in Housing: Housing Credits, in Mitchell, supra note 235.  
 247. Hockett, supra note 246; Semer, supra note 246.  
 248. Hockett, supra note 246; Semer, supra note 246. 
 249. 12 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (2006)  
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Banks provided standards and supervision to member institutions—the 
private mutual savings banks (MSBs) then responsible for most mortgage 
lending—and, in return, supplied added lines of credit on the security of 
mortgage loans that they held (in effect ―monetizing‖ those mortgages).250  
The new Congress that took office in 1933 built upon Hoover‘s well-
designed initiative. It did so first with a Home Owners‘ Loan Act (HOLA) 
in 1933,
251
 which temporarily established a Home Owners Loan 
Corporation (HOLC) for refinancing foreclosed loans on favorable terms 
to enable erstwhile homeowners to recover their homes. It also laid the 
groundwork for a steady spread of more MSBs, by directly affording 
national charters even where state authorities might have barred entry.
252
  
One year later, the National Housing Act (NHA) of 1934
253
 afforded a 
system of deposit insurance for the MSBs analogous to that newly 
instituted for depositors in commercial banks, further boosting the 
availability of lendable deposits. More critically, the NHA instituted a 
system of insurance for the MSBs themselves, against defaulting 
mortgagors. Section 203 of the Act established a nationwide ―mutual 
mortgage insurance system,‖ through which a newly created, and in this 
case now permanent, Federal Housing Administration (FHA) could insure 
first mortgage loans made for the construction, purchase, or refinancing of 
one-to-four bedroom family homes. In effect, FHA took over and 
discharged indefinitely the functions of the HOLC, which from its 
inception had been conceived as ad hoc and temporary.
254
  
FHA still operates today, guaranteeing and, in many cases, originating 
or refinancing mortgages that conform to the standards that it imposes (so-
called ―conforming‖ mortgages).255 It also affords financial counseling to 
borrowers. And it does all of this at no cost to the public fisc—the only 
federal agency to do so.  
The FHA and its insurance scheme fundamentally altered the regime of 
home financing in the United States. It effectively replaced traditional 
collateralization requirements with national default-risk pooling, rendering 
home loans more affordable. The uniform requirements upon which FHA 
conditioned its insurance, for its part, fostered the development of a 
standardized home mortgage instrument marketable throughout the 
 
 
 250. See supra note 246. 
 251. 12 U.S.C. § 1464 et seq. (2006) 
 252. Id. § 601 et seq. 
 253. 48 Stat. 1246 (1934).  
 254. 12 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.  
 255. Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means, supra note 4. 
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country: the familiar thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgage so common to low 
end mortgage finance until recently. This, in turn, opened the door to 
securitization and hence yet more complete risk pooling. The housing 
quality requirements upon which FHA conditioned its insurance also 
ensured the financial rationality of federally facilitated home-finance 
investments. And FHA‘s requirements of (a) actuarial soundness, and (b) 
risk classifying and separate pooling ensured that the system retained the 
traditional efficiencies of a private insurance market.
256
 That is why it still 
operates in the black. 
Congress effectively completed its ad hoc discovery of our now 
familiar method of financially engineered home-ownership-spreading in 
1938, by chartering the first modern ―government-sponsored enterprise‖ 
(GSE). The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, or Fannie 
Mae) was charged with making a national market in FHA-insured 
mortgage instruments themselves, i.e., with ―securitizing‖ those 
mortgages.
257
 In effect, Fannie Mae along with later progeny (in particular 
Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac, to say nothing of the higher education loan 
securitizers like Sallie Mae, expressly patterned after the Fannie Mae 
model
258
), closed the proverbial circle, separately completing the markets 
for housing credit and credit-risk bearing, thereby optimizing the 
availability of such credit to home buyers in the manner described earlier.  
Fannie Mae proved sufficiently successful, even on market terms, to 
privatize in 1968.
259
 (Sallie Mae did so in late 2004.)
260
 Freddie, for its 
part, was instituted in 1970 specifically in order to compete with the newly 
privatized and gargantuan Fannie.
261
 Both Fannie and Freddie 
subsequently came to offer a multitude of home finance services and 
operated effectively, as well as profitably, in spreading home-ownership 
until recently.
262
  
 
 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. See Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com (last visited May 18, 2010).  
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Here is the full picture: 
FIGURE 8: HOME-FINANCING STRUCTURE AFTER FEDERAL HOME-
FINANCE LEGISLATION OF THE 1930S & 1940S 
 
 
Note that HOLC, whose Board comprised FHLBB Board Members, 
was—by terms of its implementing legislation—a temporary measure, 
phased out in 1936. FHLBB, FHA, and FSLIC have since been merged 
into or brought under the aegis of the Federal Housing Finance Board, 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), respectively; but the home-finance 
structure mapped here itself remains intact.  
Complementing this whole picture, of course, was an extensive 
overhaul to our system of financial regulation put into place during the 
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1930s. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 prohibited commercial banks from 
affiliating with securities firms or insurance companies.
263
 The same Act 
introduced interest rate regulation imposed upon depository institutions, 
with a view to preventing ―destructive competition‖ among them—which 
had been blamed for encouraging overly speculative forms of investment 
on the part of those institutions.
264
 The Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 
1933 brought both a national system of deposit insurance and a new lever 
with which a federal regulator—the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation—could impose capital requirements and other ―safety and 
soundness‖ regulations upon depository institutions.265  
Meanwhile, the Securities Act of 1933, followed by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisors and Investment 
Company Acts of 1940, of course brought us our familiar forms of 
securities regulation, as well as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.
266
 All of these enactments worked to prevent practices of 
bank-levered speculation and other abuses on the securities markets, even 
as the home-finance measures worked to stabilize real estate markets.  
What, then, went wrong? In essence, the story is just that told in the 
previous Part, albeit with two added wrinkles that helped set the stage. 
First, interest rate regulation and limits on investments by thrift institutions 
were relaxed in the middle 1980s, setting the stage for ―destructive 
competition‖ in the thrift industry later that decade.267 The resultant 
savings and loan crisis ravaged the industry of home-lending institutions 
that grew during the 1930s, thanks to the Hoover and Roosevelt initiatives 
related above.
268
 That gap quickly began to be filled by non-deposit-
taking, hence unregulated, ―mortgage banks,‖ as described above. We 
have seen the role that these played in the recent real estate bubble, 
particularly commencing in the mid-1990s, when they began to extend 
growing numbers of ―subprime,‖ non-FHA-conforming loans.  
Second, Fannie and Freddie were caught up in bubble psychology just 
like so many others, including the Fed Chairman, as noted before. It was 
quite profitable to buy ever more risky, non-FHA-conforming mortgages 
 
 
 263. Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-44, 47 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 
12 U.S.C.). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006). 
 266. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78a (2006); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (2006). 
 267. See, e.g., Rob Jameson, ERisk, Case Study: US Savings & Loan Crisis, Aug. 2002, 
http://www.erisk.com/learning/casestudies/ussavingsloancrisis.asp [hereinafter ERisk Case Study]. 
 268. Id. 
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so long as property values kept growing at the rates that they grew in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. And global investors in Fannie and Freddie, 
including many a large sovereign wealth fund or treasury, insisted that 
these profits be sought.
269
 
At the same time, in view of their original missions as engines of our 
American home-ownership society, members of Congress and other 
officials during the Clinton and Bush years alike—themselves evidently 
caught up in the belief that real estate ―could only go up‖—in some cases 
actively pressured the old GSEs to take on more risky mortgages.
270
 Why 
not pursue the original salutary mission all the more aggressively, after all, 
if even the Fed Chairman was convinced that real estate would just keep 
rising in value? Finally, in view of Fannie‘s governmental lineage, 
Fannie‘s and Freddie‘s ―implicit‖ federal guarantees, and both institutions‘ 
associated ―too big to fail‖ status, Fannie and Freddie were all the more 
able to attract plenty of purchasers of their securities.  
Ultimately, of course, all of this landed Fannie and Freddie in very hot 
water. The real estate slump that commenced in the summer of 2006 hit 
them especially hard, for they held the great bulk of low-end mortgages.
271
 
We know where it led: Fannie and Freddie were ultimately renationalized 
in September of 2008.
272
 Many took this for an ominous sign, on all fours 
with the totterings of Bear Stearns, Countrywide, Lehman Brothers, 
Merrill Lynch, AIG, and Washington Mutual, among others.
273
 What we 
ought really to see in the renationalization of Fannie and Freddie, 
however, is opportunity. And restoration of home values, home-owning, 
and finance. That takes us on to the solution of our present crisis. For in 
effect, what we have now—with the unregulated ―mortgage bank‖ 
industry wiped out and Fannie and Freddie restored—is our original 1930s 
package again, under one roof.  
Here is the key, I believe, to solving our current problems. The restored 
FHA, Fannie, and Freddie team can quickly address the short-term side of 
our trouble by doing their original jobs and thus stabilizing the real estate 
markets. A restored system of financial regulation, in turn—extending the 
 
 
 269. See, e.g., Newshour: Investigating Fannie Mae and the Housing Bubble (PBS television 
broadcast Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/jan-june10/fannie_04-
09.html. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M. 
Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets 
and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm. 
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system we put into place in the 1930s to new fields of finance currently 
not regulated at all—will for its part address the longer-term problem. To 
these two sets of coordinated solutions, we now turn. 
IV. HOME RESTORATION: TRIAGE AND LONGER-TERM MAINTENANCE 
Let us begin by recalling that there are two salient components of the 
present crisis. Then we shall see two solutions before us: one short-term, 
the other longer-term. 
A. Still-Life of and for the Present Moment 
The first, ―core‖ component of the present crisis as related in Part II.B 
is the doubtful value of an uncertain number of subprime mortgages and 
associated MBSs. These are held in varying quantities by a large number 
of financial institutions (FIs) worldwide, many of which appear not as yet 
fully to have reported the sizes of their holdings. These securities, 
moreover, as noted above, underlie financial derivative commitments on 
the part of yet more FIs worldwide, with notional values that appear 
likewise as yet to be underreported. The MBSs, for their part, are now 
widely perceived to be ―toxic‖ because many—though certainly not all 
and, indeed, not even a majority—of the mortgages backing them are 
troubled.
274
  
Now, as we have seen, many of the mentioned mortgages are troubled 
because they were imprudently or, in some cases, ―predatorily‖ extended 
by participants in the shadow industry of scarcely regulated ―mortgage 
banks‖ that developed and then grew in the vacuum left by those S&Ls 
lost in the 1990s.
275
 These institutions proliferated rapidly with, while 
 
 
 274. To be more fine-grained, MBSs associated with a particular pool of mortgages are typically 
divided into three or more tranches. The largest tranche generally comprises the least risky, hence 
lowest return, stream of payments, often accounting for 70% of a pool‘s nominal value. See, e.g., 
MORRIS, supra note 15. The next tranche typically comprises a slightly more risky, hence slightly 
higher return, stream of payments, and accounts for 20% of the pool‘s nominal value. Id. The final 
tranche, typically accounting for 10% of the pool‘s nominal value, comprises the most risky, but also, 
of course, highest yield, stream of payments. This tranche is colorfully said to include the pool‘s ―toxic 
waste.‖ Id. The ―toxic‖ MBSs are of course principally associated with this tranche of most pools. But 
as I shall note further below, as confidence is lost, one tranche‘s ―toxicity‖ comes to taint, in 
perception, other tranches as well.  
 275. The network of S&Ls, fostered by President Hoover in the early 1930s to revitalize real 
estate markets and further developed by President Roosevelt thereafter to the same end, was done-in 
by the LBO-fueling junk bond craze of the later 1980s, made possible by the Reagan Administration‘s 
and Congress‘s elimination of previously tight regulation of S&L investment practices. ERisk Case 
Study, supra note 267.   
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indeed helping to fuel, our recent Fed-enabled real estate bubble.
276
 Naive, 
non-credit-checked, and in some cases clearly uncreditworthy borrowers 
not only received loans from these institutions, but often were lured with 
offers of newfangled ARMs, featuring low front-end ―teaser‖ payments 
that later ―ballooned.‖277  
Now, ordinarily, neither borrowers nor lenders would likely have 
expected anything good to come of loans on such terms as those I have 
described. But fees, risk-transferability, and especially speculative asset 
bubbles, as discussed above in Part II, have a funny way of changing 
people‘s calculations. Borrowers not unreasonably assume that they can 
regularly refinance inexpensively, on the strength of the underlying 
collateral‘s apparently inexorable appreciation. Primary and secondary 
lenders naturally assume likewise. And again, such assumptions seem far 
from far-fetched while the bubble is growing.  
Now for a time in these cases, everyone does indeed win. The process 
takes on the self-fulfillingly prophetic, spontaneous ―chain letter‖ or 
Ponzi-like character of our model sketched in Part II.A. More are drawn 
into the market as prices keep rising. Some hope to clear speculative 
profits by ―flipping‖ the assets they borrow to buy. Others, more 
innocently perhaps, reasonably judge that they can prudently purchase to 
hold, but on more highly levered terms than they might otherwise have 
accepted. And still others are mixed cases of holder-cum-speculator.
278
 In 
all cases, in any event, as the new entrants keep entering, the prices do 
keep rising, in effect validating the judgments of those who act upon the 
expectation of continued ascent.  
But, of course, bubbles never grow indefinitely; the inflection point 
always is reached. The Ponzi growth rate slows at some point in the 
indefinite medium term—whatever the more definite, long-term trend 
 
 
 276. There seems to be growing consensus that the Fed kept lending rates too low over most of the 
1990s and early–mid-2000s. A charitable interpretation is that it understandably overshot in addressing 
the slowdowns first threatened by the S&L, Asian financial, and Russian debt default crises of the 
1990s, then indeed occasioned by the deflation of the tech bubble in 2000 and the 9/11 attacks of 2001. 
There are, of course, also less charitable interpretations. See, e.g., FLECKENSTEIN WITH SHEEHAN, 
supra note 140; Paul Krugman, Greenspan‘s Bubbles, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=926409. 
 277. See, e.g., SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION, supra note 9, at 6–8. 
 278. Those who borrow with a view to buying homes that they will actually occupy buy more 
expensive homes, for example—their down payments, in turn, constituting smaller portions of the total 
to be paid. Others borrow with a view to purchasing homes that they intend all along to ―flip‖ at a 
profit. Still others are actuated by motives that combine the first two, perhaps planning to continue 
residing in the home if appreciation rates slow, and to ―flip‖ the home or ―trade up‖ should 
appreciation continue apace.  
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lines might be, as credit limits are eventually closed in upon.
279
 When that 
happens, the spontaneous Ponzi process abruptly halts and then quickly 
reverses. The reason is that there are no more new entrants to finance 
continued growth in the value of previous entrants‘ holdings, while it has 
been precisely on the strength of such anticipated growth that entrants 
have increased their debt burdens. The buildup of worry—―how long can 
this continue?‖—accordingly discharges at last. The ―Minsky Moment‖ is 
reached.
280
 Now, many erstwhile winners, having been nervously mindful 
all along that a peak followed by mass exit must at some point be reached 
once the credit runs out, seek to salvage gains or cut losses by being first 
to jump ship. It is a bank-run-reminiscent scenario. But in modern, 
electronically traded markets, the time span between first and last is paper-
thin. Prices plunge quickly, and with them the reliability of those 
repayment obligations associated with the credit extensions that enabled 
the rise.  
This, of course, is the fate that befell our own housing bubble. Prices 
leveled off, then began falling in mid-2006.
281
 The ensuing slump quickly 
began to throw ill-structured, bubble-time mortgages into default, as 
market valuations of underlying assets began falling below nominal debt 
obligations.
282
 Default rates, not surprisingly, have since grown steadily.
283
 
And as they have grown, the market values of mortgages, mortgage-
backed securities, and associated derivative obligations have dropped yet 
further.
284
 In effect, the same feedback loop structure that characterized the 
buildup now characterizes the comedown—for ―run-ups,‖ we have seen, 
just are ―runs‖ in reverse.  
The second, penumbral component of our mortgage-rooted financial 
crisis accordingly is, no pun intended, derivative in character. It is mass-
psychological, simply the flipside of the just-described Ponzi process. 
Something much like the proverbial ―market for lemons‖ known to 
macroeconomists since at least the time of Akerlof‘s and Stiglitz‘s 
 
 
 279. This seems the right place to trot out the inevitable quotation of Keynes, to the effect that ―in 
the long run, we‘re all dead.‖ We might also liken things here to a sort of reversal of Al Gore‘s 
frequent observation that this year‘s being cooler than last year constitutes no refutation of long-term 
global warming. The trend-line‘s sloping upward over the long haul does not prevent its being jagged 
over long enough periods to be either misleading (in the case of climate change skeptics) or 
devastating (in the case of investment naifs).  
 280. The reference is, of course, to HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 
(1986), a work that seems unsurprisingly to be enjoying a bit of a rediscovery. 
 281. See MORRIS, supra note 15. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
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canonical contributions of the early 1970s and 1980s (for which, of course, 
both won Nobels
285
), and to financiers since Gresham first postulated the 
―Law‖ bearing his name, follows many a burst bubble.286 The prevailing 
mood changes, tendencies toward risk aversion are heightened, and 
uncertainties are resolved by assuming the worst rather than the best.  
In the present iteration of this depressingly familiar story, no 
institutions or persons know precisely what portions of their own MBS-
holdings (or derivative positions tied positively to MBS values) will prove 
―underperforming‖ in consequence of the mortgage industry‘s post-crash 
troubles. That is partly because no one knows precisely which mortgages 
will foreclose, thus which securities will prove underperforming or how 
much. And it is partly because no one knows how low particular property 
values, or property values more generally, will fall. And finally, it is partly 
because property values, hence mortgage and thus MBS and derivative 
values, are themselves partly determined by whatever action we 
collectively take or do not take to prevent defaults. There is a significant 
element of self-fulfilling prophecy in whatever we do here, just as there 
was self-fulfilling prophecy in the growth of the Ponzi-like bubble itself. 
And so until action on the part of the collectivity is taken by some agent 
authorized to act in the name of all, each private party assumes the worst 
and seeks exit.  
This self-fulfilling prophecy piece of the story, for its part, steadily 
radiates outward. The market grows ever more jittery over the just-
enumerated uncertainties. The longer these jitters endure, the more prone 
investors become to undervalue affected financial institutions‘ MBS-
including or MBS-derived portfolios, and hence, ultimately, those 
institutions‘ own issuances. The more they in consequence shed their 
stakes in these institutions, in turn, the more quickly the remaining such 
stakes lose their short-run values. In effect, there‘s a ―run on the banks,‖ in 
this case by shareholders rather than depositors—as used to happened 
before there was federal deposit insurance. The negative feedback loop 
found in the market for MBSs accordingly spreads beyond those 
securities, both to derivative contracts and to the obligations of firms that 
are heavily invested in these securities. The familiar financial ―contagion‖ 
ensues.  
The process is aided and abetted by mark-to-market accounting rules 
that require institutions to value their assets as the market values them—
 
 
 285. Id. 
 286. George A. Akerlof, The Market for ―Lemons‖: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 20.  
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even when, thanks to the panic psychology at work here, the market 
arguably is grossly undervaluing them. And with affected institutions in 
turn interlinked by collateralized debt obligations, credit-default swaps, 
and other derivative risk-sharing arrangements, even those not holding 
MBSs end up affected. The ―downward spiral‖ winds steadily downward. 
But what goes down can be turned back up and brought to a much more 
sustainable stratum.  
Enter here FHA and its GSE siblings: We can reverse the widening 
downward spiral that is this crisis‘s penumbral component, as Treasury‘s 
original late September 2008 plan itself contemplated, by directly 
addressing the cause at its core—the bad mortgages and the securities they 
back.
287
 And this is precisely what FHA and its newly renationalized GSEs 
originally were and are for, as just seen in Part III.  
With FHA still in operation as the sole federal agency that operates at 
no cost to the public fisc, and with its prodigal siblings now back in the 
family, we are actually now very well situated to address the mortgage 
crisis at the core of our imminent global financial crisis. Indeed, we can 
easily set the team to work in a manner a lot like the manner in which it 
operated in solving that real estate crisis that prompted its founding in the 
first place. Here is how to do it. 
B. Home Repair: Triage for the Near Term 
Solving our present crisis requires both triage for the immediate crisis 
and longer-term preventive maintenance to prevent a recurrence. Here, I 
treat the former by laying out two complementary tasks to be discharged 
by FHA and its newly renationalized GSE siblings. Then in Part IV.C, I 
address the longer term. 
1. Fannie and Freddie: First Clean Up the Secondary Market  
The first thing we must do is, through the now once again refederalized 
GSEs, employ recovered TARP moneys to purchase and repurchase 
perceivedly ―troubled‖ MBSs from key financial institutions now holding 
them, as originally envisaged by Treasury. Fannie and Freddie can then 
add them to the large numbers of such securities that they already once 
 
 
 287. Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Emergency Economic Stablization Act of 2008 
(Sept. 28, 2008), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/financialsvcs_dem/press092808. 
shtml; see also Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/t/troubled-asset-relief-program-tarp.asp (last visited May 18, 2010). 
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again hold. We should pay more than currently undervalued market value, 
but lower than discounted cash flow value. That way, value will be 
recouped as MBSs rise back to less panic-depressed values. And that way, 
we will lso ensure that financial institutions that overinvested in MBSs 
incur some cost, thereby mitigating the moral hazard concerns occasioned 
by any bailout. In effect, we will be taking a ―deductible,‖ or conferring 
the attributes of ―coinsurance‖ on the bailout. 
How much more than currently undervalued market—but lower than 
discounted cash flow—value, should we pay out? Many methods have 
been proposed, the best known among them probably the ―reverse 
auction‖ first proposed by Treasury in September of 2008.288 Reverse 
auctioning certainly seems the most efficient means of dividing the surplus 
that we will be recouping. But we shall do best to prescind here from fine-
tuned accounting and valuation matters, however, as there is surely a range 
of reasonable possibilities within which to choose. What matters for the 
present is that MBSs are substantially undervalued at present by a spooked 
market, for the same psychological reasons that account for their having 
been overvalued by our erstwhile euphoric market. And this fact itself, if 
there is more or less symmetry between first the euphoric and then the 
dejected ―animal spirits‖ that have been at work in the MBS market this 
decade, suggests somewhere near the mean between peak and trough rates 
as a good working benchmark against which to check observed auction 
rates, perhaps marginally adjusted in recognition of any asymmetry 
thought to be worked by endowment or related effects.  
Will the MBSs rise back to higher values as suggested? Yes, for 
reasons rooted in the ―market for lemons‖ and ―self-fulfilling prophecy‖ 
phenomena noted above and just mentioned again. The problem in this 
case is that, while we know that only a small minority of mortgages will 
actually default and that only a minority of MBSs will actually prove to be 
―toxic,‖ we do not know which ones. During those periods of irrational 
despair that follow periods of irrational exuberance, individuals 
irrationally fear that they are holding the underperforming investments 
disproportionately. Let‘s call it a ―reverse Wobegon‖ problem: Each 
individual worries, ―I might have only the bad ones.‖289 Fearing this 
individually, they then, in effect, make it so collectively, by stampeding to 
sell what they irrationally undervalue. In short, we have a classic 
collective action problem, one that in this case artificially deflates value.  
 
 
 288. Press Release, supra note 287.  
 289. The allusion, of course, is to Garrison Keillor‘s proverbial town of Lake Wobegon, where 
―all of the children are above average.‖  
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Concentrate ownership of the full affected portfolio, then, and we 
address this collective action problem head on and entirely solve it. Each 
security then can effectively be valued at the mean, without anyone having 
to know which particular securities in fact possess more or less than mean 
value. The problem of individuals all fearing that they hold securities of 
less than mean value—the ―reverse Wobegon problem‖—is immediately 
solved. We restore full portfolio value, in short, precisely by concentrating 
ownership of the full portfolio, booking the difference between that and 
the current irrationally depressed market value of dispersed securities. 
Concentrating ownership also, it happens, will facilitate smooth operation 
of the second part of the FHA/GSE plan that I am proposing, the part that 
restores value to underlying mortgages themselves. On, then, to that.  
2. FHA: Restore Order to the Primary Market  
The second and complementary part of the short-term side of the plan 
is this: Through FHA, we should simultaneously arrange refinancing and 
financial counseling for those mortgagees who, owing to poorly structured 
or misleadingly packaged mortgages, are now going under. We should 
make a priority of first-time, single-home buyers who have purchased the 
homes to occupy them, and who might realistically pay for them if only 
their payment structures are smoothed. We should show less solicitude for 
―second‖ or ―nth‖ homes that clearly are speculative properties purchased 
for ―flipping,‖ unless there is a good chance of saving foreclosure costs by 
refinancing. And we can show intermediate solicitude for those who, 
though not strictly speculators, have nonetheless grossly overreached—
helping to refinance some, while gradualizing workouts and foreclosures 
on others. FHA is quite experienced with all of these options and more.  
Note that all of this can be done at a reasonable, unforced pace once 
FHA‘s sibling GSEs have purchased or repurchased the great bulk of 
MBSs per the first part of the plan. For the newly renationalized GSEs do 
not face the same short-term financial imperatives as private lenders. Nor 
do they face the bargaining problems that confront dispersed classes of 
creditors in more garden-variety insolvency situations. For, yes, debt 
workouts, too, are familiarly a collective action problem, as any 
bankruptcy expert will readily attest.
290
 This, then, is yet another benefit of 
concentrating ownership of these now-troubled assets in the hands of our 
GSEs. And it will enhance the value of the assets themselves, precisely by 
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preventing massive foreclosures and their associated costs, and thus 
preserving the value of those mortgages that underlie the presently ―toxic‖ 
MBSs.  
It bears noting here, while we‘re at it, that FHA can affect mortgage 
refinancings much more efficiently than judges or any new cadre of 
bankruptcy trustees of the sort that some are proposing would do. For one 
thing, this is because, again, refinancing is already an FHA specialty. But 
for another thing, it is because the GSEs‘ repurchasing of MBSs will 
eliminate the usual holdout problems that afflict ordinary debt workouts in 
the vicinity of court-administered bankruptcy. I think that this renders the 
paired FHA/GSE plan superior, moreover, to Professor Shiller‘s proposal 
for a new HOLC.
291
 For the latter would not only just recreate an agency 
that FHA was itself instituted to replace and make permanent, but also 
would not yield the concentrated MBS-ownership advantages that this 
plan involves.  
Offer to buy troubled MBSs, then, and many, if not most, who now 
hold them will sell. Then, we can refinance mortgages with speed, but 
with deliberate speed—without pressure. As for any who do not sell their 
MBSs per the plan, note first that they would have to constitute one-third 
of the mortgage credit outstanding on any one home if they wished to 
block refinancing. That seems unlikely. Note finally that if, improbably, 
they were to constitute such a bloc and then seek to obstruct refinancing 
arrangements by FHA, there would surely be sufficient ground for the 
government to exercise its eminent domain power and pay the amount 
paid to the last—or, indeed, even the first—voluntary sellers of MBSs to 
the holdouts. A securities covenant is no more a suicide pact than is the 
Constitution, and there is no reason whatever to honor exploitative holdout 
power in times of exigency like the present. If anything, there is reason to 
shame holdouts publicly, along with the worst of that comparative 
minority of borrowers and lenders who were grossly negligent in the midst 
of the bubble.  
So how much, then, will all of this cost? That is, of course, hard to say, 
in view of the feedback-effect-rooted indeterminacies that we have noted 
to be at work in the present crisis. The best we can reasonably expect at 
 
 
 291. Professor Shiller‘s proposal is made in SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION, supra note 9. A 
similar plan, proposed by Congressman Frank and Senator Dodd, was put forth in 2007, but withdrawn 
in the face of opposition by industry groups, Republicans in Congress, and the Bush Administration. 
The Dodd/Frank plan would have employed FHA, but—proposed as it was before Fannie and Freddie 
had been renationalized—did not involve GSE‘s sweeping of troubled MBSs from the market. Now 
that we have the full team together again, prospects look better.  
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the present, I think, is to take cognizance of the range of reasonably 
anticipated possibilities. At one end of this range is the possibility that 
FHA and its renationalized GSE siblings will actually come out in the 
black. Certainly that is what happened from the late 1930s onward, when 
the original package was first put into place.
292
 And, indeed, it is why 
Fannie was ultimately privatized, and it is why FHA has operated at a 
profit since its inception. It also bears noting that Messrs Bernanke, Bush, 
and Paulson themselves argued that TARP, in light of the market‘s then-
undervaluing of MBSs—even without the salvaging of mortgage, hence 
MBS values—could ultimately bring a net gain to the fisc; the government 
would be ―buying low‖ assets that it could later ―sell high.‖293  
How about the less rosy end of the range of possibilities? That one is 
just a bit harder to estimate. This owes, in part, to the aforementioned 
feedback-effect-rooted indeterminacies. It owes also to the countervailing 
effects of the aforementioned MBS-appreciation apt to be wrought by 
concentrated ownership on the one hand, and the MBS-depreciation apt to 
be wrought by continued home-value decline and foreclosures on the other 
hand. Worst case scenario, one supposes, would be that the full amount 
spent purchasing troubled MBSs would be lost. One hastens to add, 
however, that this worst-case scenario seems far from plausible, for all of 
the reasons adduced above.  
C. Home Maintenance: Care for the Long Term  
Particularly in view of the nature of the present crisis, as well as of its 
predecessor crisis of the 1930s, the short-term solution proposed in Part 
II.B should bring an expeditious halt to our immediate difficulties. This 
raises an anterior question, however: How do we prevent a recurrence?  
The answer, I believe, lies in two clues. The first clue is the model of 
asset price bubbles and bursts laid out in Part II, of which our present 
crisis is a textbook case. The second clue lies in that broader system of 
financial regulation, described in Part III, which the Hoover and Roosevelt 
era Congresses enacted as a complement to the home-finance programs 
put into place in the same era. For, as seen above, partial dismantling of 
that system played a critical role in enabling our recent stock and then real 
estate bubbles. 
 
 
 292. See supra Part III. 
 293. George W. Bush, President, Speech to the Nation on the Economic Crisis (Sept. 24, 2008), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/business/economy/24text-bush.html?pagewanted=1. 
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In this Subpart, then, I turn to a brief sketch of ―reforms‖—or rather, 
restorations—to our system of financial regulation that will complement 
the restorations just sketched to our system of mortgage finance. 
Completing the package in this way will restore us to longer term financial 
health of the kind that we enjoyed nearly uninterrupted from the later 
1930s to the mid-1990s.  
1. Regulation as Modulation: The Fed and Bubble Preemption 
Easily the most important lesson to be drawn from the model of asset 
price bubbles and bursts schematized in Part II.A, I think, is the critical 
role that the Fed must play in preventing bubbles from emerging and 
inflating in the first instance. There are two principal reasons for saying 
this.  
The first reason is that, as observed in Part II.B, all other forms of 
regulation, as well as self-help, tend to break down when a bubble is 
inflating. The reason for that is now obvious: While asset prices are rising, 
the risk measures, according to which risk regulators operate and private 
parties decide on courses of action, decline. When assets are more highly 
valued, it is easier for financial institutions to comply with their debt 
obligations. It is likewise easier for borrowers to collateralize. And it is 
easy for everyone to feel safer than they actually are. 
The second reason to emphasize the Fed‘s role is that, as observed in 
Part II.A, asset price bubbles are collective action problems. There need be 
no individual irrationality or rascality for a bubble to begin and inflate. 
Nor need there be any inefficiency on the part of the market when it comes 
to impounding price-relevant information into the prices of assets. The 
problems upon which bubbles depend, rather, are first the absence of 
relevant information—which can itself be the product of a collective 
action problem, as I will explain presently—and second the absence of a 
collective actor to act on behalf of the dispersed actors. The needed 
information, for its part, is in the nature of a public good, which will tend 
accordingly to be underprovided by private actors; its absence, in other 
words, is itself partly the product of a collective action problem. The 
needed action, for its part, is not only information assembling, but also 
coordinative in character; it is a matter of solving an information problem 
and a prisoner‘s dilemma. 
Both of these roles are Fed roles, the Fed being the nearest we have to a 
―systemic risk regulator.‖ It is for the Fed to assemble the information 
required to determine whether asset prices are inflating, ―Beautiful Baby‖-
style, beyond levels explicable by underlying, ―fundamental‖ value. It is 
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likewise for the Fed, as the ―designated driver,‖ to tighten up on available 
credit and loose money when individuals begin acting in manners that, 
although individually rational, are collectively irrational in the ―positive-
feedback,‖ ―Ponzi-process‖ manner. 
Can the Fed do that? If the model layed out in Part II is correct, then 
yes, it certainly can. The Fed, from the late 1980s until recently, failed to 
act, one suspects, owing to a misconception on the part of its principal 
officers. That misconception sometimes was stated in the form of a claim 
to the effect that bubbles are not detectable until after they burst.
294
 Other 
times, it has been stated in the form of a claim to the effect that, since 
bubble behavior is irrational and inefficient, while long-term irrationality 
and inefficiency cannot be plausibly attributed to asset markets, bubbles 
cannot actually occur.
295
  
But neither of these claims is correct. The model in Part II.A shows 
where the second claim comes a cropper. And the tables presented in Part 
II.B show where the first claim goes wrong. While, of course, it is not easy 
to separate out ―fundamental‖ value and ―merely speculative‖ value with 
scalpel-like precision or an entirely bright line, it is often quite easy to find 
reasonable proxies for fundamental value and then to compare prevailing 
market prices to them. When home prices depart as significantly from 
counterpart rental prices and from building costs, as Figures 4 and 5 above 
show that they did in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there simply cannot 
be serious doubt that a bubble is afoot. Like remarks hold for the P/E ratio 
and stock price comparisons called to attention by Shiller and others in 
regard to our stock markets during the mid- to late 1990s.
296
  
Moreover, there are other ways, at least in potential, to draw a bead on 
the point at which markets have shifted into bubble territory. As John 
Geanakoplos has argued persuasively for over a decade now, as well as 
partly corroborated, speculative asset price bubbles correlate closely to 
growth in economy-wide leverage. That is to say, collaterization 
requirements drop and, what amounts to the same thing, loan-to-value 
ratios rise sharply during speculative asset price bubbles.
297
 Geanakoplos‘s 
work can be viewed as an updating of Irving Fisher‘s ―debt deflation‖ 
 
 
 294. See, e.g., GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE, supra note 56, at 137.  
 295. See supra notes 35, 65 and accompanying text; see also supra note 56 (discussing the 
undetectability of bubbles). 
 296. See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 9. 
 297. See, e.g., John Geanakoplos, Promises, Promises, in THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING 
COMPLEX SYSTEM 285, 285–320 (Brian Arthur et al. eds., 1997); John Geanakoplos, The Leverage 
Cycle (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Geanakoplos, The Leverage 
Cycle]. 
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account of depressions.
298
 Against the backdrop of the model laid out in 
Part II, it is easy to see why this would be the case; growth in loan-to-
value ratios would be an obvious reflection of lenders‘ betting, in effect, 
on continued capital gains on the part of their borrowers. Ironically—and 
to this Article‘s way of thinking, tragically—however, no public authority 
tracks economy-wide leverage ratios, while no private institution has 
enforceable access to the necessary data.
299
 That is why, by the way, 
Geanakoplos has been able only ―partly,‖ as I just put it, to corroborate his 
claims; he has had access only to leverage data concerning securities in 
respect of which his own hedge fund has taken positions.
300
 
In sum, then, just as Part IV.B has just proposed that Fannie and 
Freddie act for the collectivity now in solving that collective action 
problem that is the market‘s mass-undervaluation of MBSs, so should the 
Fed act for the collectivity in the longer term to solve those paired 
collective action problems that are the market‘s occasional mass-
overvaluation of assets, partly in consequence of missing bubble-relevant 
information. Collective action problems demand collective actors. And 
when it comes to finance, the Fed—or perhaps, in the near future, the Fed 
as supplemented by a new ―Systemic Risk Council‖—is our principal such 
actor.
301
  
How, precisely, might the Fed‘s taking this role seriously again lead to 
what I have called ―modulation?‖ There are several ways. First, 
assembling and publicizing information of the kinds that I have just cited 
would enable private actors themselves to act in ways that would tend to 
modulate asset price swings. For those swings, as I have modeled them, 
occur against a backdrop of ―radical,‖ ―Knightian‖ uncertainty that 
information of the sort that I have just noted will tend to displace. With the 
availability of such information, risk-averse investors would be less 
inclined to go long on assets in respect of which bubbles would otherwise 
form, and lenders would be less inclined to extend credit to them—at least 
to do so without requiring more in the way of collateral, interest, or both.  
By the same token, more actors would be incentivized to go short—to 
bet against—continued asset price rises. For they would now possess 
sufficient information to appreciate more fully the sense in which—and 
 
 
 298. For Fisher‘s ―debt inflation‖ account of depressions, see supra note 114. 
 299. See Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle, supra note 297. 
 300. See id.; see also Whitehouse, supra note 174. 
 301. The ―Systemic Risk Council‖ idea figures in the Dodd proposal before the U.S. Senate at the 
time of this writing. See Robert Hockett, Senator Dodd‘s Proposed Finance-Regulatory ‗Overhaul‘, 
Mar. 25, 2010, http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/03/senator-dodds-proposed-finance.html. 
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the timing with which—a bubble is underway and apt, before long, to 
reach its erstwhile radically uncertain endpoint.  
Second, and relatedly, any inadequacy in private rates of betting 
against bubbles could readily be supplemented by regulatory action. For 
one thing, of course, the Fed now would have means of better timing their 
boosting of the market rate of interest, the credit-dampening margin 
requirements imposed upon financial institutions, or both. For another 
thing—and here we would be speaking not simply of the Fed, but the IRS 
working in cooperation with the Fed—we could readily impose a form of 
―Tobin taxation‖ on the capital gains realized by those who ―flip‖ assets 
like houses during times of speculative excess, as now would be newly 
determinable by the Fed. In effect, such a measure would address from the 
capital gains side precisely what increased interest rates or margin 
requirements would address from the leverage side—viz., the spread that 
dramatically grows between borrowing costs and capital gains during any 
credit-fueled asset price bubble.
302
  
It bears noting, before I turn to my other recommendations, that bubble 
preemption can even be viewed as a straightforward extension of the Fed‘s 
statutory inflation-prevention (―stable prices‖) mandate.303 For, in light of 
the discussion of asset price bubbles above in Part II, what is such a 
bubble if not an instance of ―hyperinflation‖? All that differs between 
consumer price hyperinflations and asset price bubbles is the underlying 
item—consumer goods in the one case, financial assets in the other. This 
feeds directly into several more incremental, but complementary, 
regulatory measures that we now would do well to undertake with a view 
to our longer-term financial well-being.  
2. Portfolio Regulation by Reference to Underlying Assets 
Asset markets‘ overvaluation of assets during times of speculative 
excess, and their undervaluation of such assets during times of 
symmetrical ―depressive‖ excess, are problem enough in themselves. But 
their harmful effects are transmitted more widely when assets are valued 
by regulators—not just the Fed, but other financial regulators as well—and 
private institutions by reference to market value. So-called ―market value‖ 
 
 
 302. Tobin taxes, which are transaction taxes placed upon churning—or in recent housing market 
language, ―flipping‖—assets of the sort characteristic of ―speculation,‖ as distinguished from ―value 
investing,‖ of course originate with James Tobin. See James Tobin, A Proposal for International 
Monetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J. 153 (1978). A helpful collection of essays on Tobin taxation is THE 
TOBIN TAX: COPING WITH FINANCIAL VOLATILITY (Mahbub ul Haq et al. eds., 1996). 
 303. 12 U.S.C. § 225(a) (2006). 
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and ―mark-to-market‖ accounting—employed by our financial regulators, 
our rating agencies, and many other institutions alike, as seen in Part II.B 
and IV.A—played a critical role in enabling our stock and real estate 
bubbles to inflate. They have more recently played an equally critical role 
in validating market actors‘ panic-rooted undervaluation of assets, again as 
noted in Part IV.A.  
Just as the Fed must attend to both ―fundamental‖ and market values 
associated with speculative assets, then, so must other regulators, raters, 
and other financial institutions. The arguments made in the 1990s and later 
for moves to ―market value accounting‖ and like methodologies on the 
part of the FDIC and other regulators and raters are fair enough.
304
 Indeed, 
it is obvious why market measures should be among those employed in 
valuing assets—particularly insofar as markets do indeed tend to be 
efficient impounders of price-relevant information. But it has never been 
obvious why such measures should altogether supplant, rather than simply 
complement, measures-by-proxy of more lasting, ―fundamental‖ value. 
The model schematized in Part II.A shows, I believe, precisely why both 
should be employed. And then, when significant divergences appear 
between the two kinds of measures and then grow over time, regulators, 
raters, and others should be required to treat this as indicative of bubble 
behavior and to tighten up leverage requirements, lending rates, and 
money accordingly.  
3. Derivative and Hedge Fund Disclosure 
Another important component of the present crisis—at least its 
peripheral components—as described above is the fact that the multitude 
of derivative financial arrangements pursuant to which asset price risk was 
transmitted worldwide have been occluded. This is surely one of the most 
remarkable and surprising features of our current finance-regulatory 
environment. As any student of securities regulation knows, the leading 
strategy adopted by Congress in the 1930s for purposes of securities 
regulation was that of disclosure.
305
 Then, private actors and regulators 
alike are more readily able to determine where and when further inquiry 
must be made. 
Our securities-regulatory disclosure regime, however, has never been 
extended to derivative transactions. And, in consequence, these 
transactions are still counted as ―off-balance-sheet activities.‖ Up through 
 
 
 304. See supra note 60 on controversies over market-value accounting. 
 305. See supra note 266.  
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the mid-1990s, there might arguably have been reason for this. Derivative 
transactions were, well, derivative—they were, at most, the tail on the dog 
of securities. Moreover, in view of their salutary risk-hedging and 
consequent market-completing properties, there might have been reason to 
give them a temporary pass for a time, to enable their use to proliferate 
and grow.  
But that growth has long since occurred, and the once-tail now very 
much wags the dog. Leaving them off of the balance sheet guarantees that 
our financial system will be kept off-balance. The time for giving 
derivatives a full pass has long since passed. None of this is to say that 
derivative arrangements ought to be impeded, much less prohibited. It is 
only to say that they ought to be regulated as other securities long have 
been regulated—through required disclosure and explicit manipulative-
activity prevention. This should be—and happily, in at least some form, 
now seems apt to be—at the top of the new Congress‘s ―to do‖ list.306 I 
will now mention two more measures, in passing, before I conclude.  
4. A Glass-Steagall for Auditors, Rating Agencies, and Regulators 
As is well known, a conspicuous bit of regulatory reform that came 
with Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 1999 was the express repeal of Glass-
Steagall.
307
 Banks now are able to affiliate with securities firms, as well as 
insurance companies, with abandon. A single financial holding company 
may hold multiple such firms. And the practice of ―stapled finance‖—
whereby affiliates advertise their services to one another‘s clients in 
brochures that travel together as package deals—ensures that customers 
know of all siblings.
308
 It is, of course, possible that all of this will have to 
be, or at any rate will be, revisited in the aftermath of our present crisis. I 
shall abstain from opining on this for present purposes, however, as there 
are other separation walls that it is much easier to say confidently that we 
ought to impose. 
In essence, there are two conspicuous conflicts of interest that 
proliferate right now and are clearly germane to the integrity of our 
financial system. One is the case of auditors and rating agencies. These 
reputational intermediaries are retained and paid by the very financial 
firms that they audit and rate. And significant evidence already is 
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emerging that some of these intermediaries have been lax in rating many 
of our recently worst-hit financial institutions.
309
 A related conflict is that 
raised by the practice of many financial regulators—not to say Members 
of Congress—who pursue careers with financial institutions after brief 
careers regulating them.  
Now, these are ―large issues‖ that deserve separate Articles in their 
own right. That seems particularly so in light of the expense that would 
likely be occasioned by assigning the tasks of auditing and rating to 
government agencies. Nevertheless, it would seem that something in the 
way of imposition of walls of separation here could be managed at little 
public cost. It would not be at all difficult, for example, simply to prohibit 
former regulators from taking positions with financial firms for some 
lengthy period—say five years or more—following their stints in office. 
By the same token, it would not be that difficult to impose upon financial 
firms, as a sort of licensing cost, fees of the sort that they pay auditors and 
raters, with a view then to publicly paying those intermediaries. A slightly 
less fundamental measure that might offer some of the same benefits 
would be to impose a wall of anonymity between rating agenices and 
those whom they rate, even when the latter pay for the ratings. Measures 
of this sort would nicely complement those more critical measures 
proposed just above.
310
  
5. Originator Liability 
As a final complementary regulatory measure recommended by the tale 
told in Parts II.B and IV.A, it is tempting to suggest that we return full 
circle to where we were circa 1995, by extending some features of that 
regulatory regime to which we subject depository institutions, to the 
industry of so-called ―mortgage banks.‖ As noted above, this industry 
grew in the vacuum left by failed thrift institutions in the early 1990s. It 
was left unregulated and played a critical role in originating the bulk of the 
mortgages that have gone bad since 2006. Yet, in view of the model 
sketched in Part II—and of the historical correlation between protracted 
economic slumps on the one hand, and combined stock and real estate 
bubbles on the other—it is very puzzling, indeed, that we permitted this. 
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We do not, after all, permit manicurists and pizza delivery companies to 
underwrite or sell securities. Why, then, did we permit them to originate 
mortgages—a form of asset at least as critical to wealth and the health of 
the macroeconomy?  
The final reform that I take our present troubles to show critical, then, 
is just this: Recognize once and for all that real estate finance is as critical 
as is corporate finance, and regulate markets in these assets accordingly. 
That might be the most crucial lesson learned by the Hoover and 
Roosevelt Administrations in the 1930s. It is also a lesson that we have 
had ample time to relearn in connection with Japan‘s, then Sweden‘s, and 
then East Asia‘s experiences over the course of the 1990s. Get as serious 
about regulating entry into these markets as we are about entry into 
banking and securities markets, then, and perhaps we won‘t have to learn 
the lesson again. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE HOUSE AS RESTORED 
To our detriment, we have forgotten the link between combined stock 
and real estate bubbles and bursts on the one hand, and protracted 
economic contraction on the other. To our detriment, we have also 
forgotten that stock and real estate bubbles can be detected while forming 
and pricked before growing. Finally, to our detriment, we have forgotten 
how the new systems of real estate finance and financial regulation put 
into place in the 1930s operated precisely to stabilize real estate and 
broader financial markets, and to prevent subsequent bubbles and bursts 
for over sixty years. 
This Article has accordingly been, in a manner, a sort of remembrance. 
But its backward look has been conducted with a forward-looking 
purpose. The model that I have offered of asset price bubbles and bursts 
shows the shared structure of past and present, and the reason, in 
consequence, that updating old measures—measures that we have already 
begun to bring back with the renationalization of Fannie and Freddie last 
August—can bring new prosperity.  
At literally no ultimate cost to the public fisc, FHA and its GSE 
siblings—Fannie and Freddie—cured our last real estate crisis. In so 
doing, they transformed us from a nation in which fewer than 40% owned 
their homes, to a nation in which 70% do. And all the while, new systems 
of bank and securities regulation—relying largely on easily administered 
disclosure, firewall, and entry-regulatory strategies—ensured that the 
broader financial system operated safely as well.  
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Since FHA remains both self-funding and best at what it does, and 
since the GSEs now have been refederalized in keeping with their original, 
pre-privatization mandates, their complementary original missions can 
now be restored. Their mandates are clear, are constitutional, and still can 
be more or less costlessly accomplished. They exist to spread and maintain 
nonspeculative home-ownership on Main Street. Set them to work on that 
now, and we will save Wall Street—and the global financial system—as 
well.  
Meanwhile, restore and extend our broader system of financial 
regulation so as to track and prevent bubbles—both at their origins and at 
all points of support—and we will keep them safe.  
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